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ABSTRACT 
 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) is a country possessing abundant resources 
of  gold,  oil,  copper,  timber,  and fish  stocks.    It  is  hampered  in  its 
development and management of these resources, however, by serious 
problems of governance and corruption.  These problems are evident 
throughout  the  economy  and  also  in  the  management  of  the 
environment.    The  level  of  environmental  damage  caused  by  the 
mining  industry  in  PNG  is  now  such  that  it  will  require  extensive 
rehabilitation,  if  the  areas  affected  can,  indeed,  ever  be  fully 
rehabilitated.  The mining companies which precipitated this damage 
were  licensed  and  encouraged  by  the  PNG  Government  in  the 
initiation  and  exercise  of  the  mining  operations.  The  resulting 
environmental  impact  has  affected  the  lives  of  thousands  of  New 
Guineans  to  their  detriment.    The  degradation  caused  remains 
unredressed.  
 
Compounding the problem, there is a growing reliance by Papua New 
Guinea  on  mineral  exploitation  for  foreign  direct  investment, 
government revenues, and foreign exchange.  Gold exports accounted 
for the biggest share of export revenues in 2002 representing 37.5% of 
the total.  In light of this growing dependency on mining activities, 
there  is  a  correspondingly  urgent  requirement  to  address  the 
deficiencies in the administrative, monitoring, and policing aspects of 
the protection of its environment.     viii 
 
Despite the public evidence of the damage to the environment and the 
ensuing  affect  on  the  people  of  Papua  New  Guinea  by  mining 
activities; and despite universal condemnation of these activities and 
the companies responsible; the companies continue to conduct these 
activities without official hindrance and with little apparent concern 
for the long-term ramifications of their actions.   
 
This  thesis  will  examine  the  degradation  resulting  from  the  mining 
activities  of  companies  in  Papua  New  Guinea  over  the  last  three 
decades  –  particularly  those  of  Placer  Dome’s  Porgera  gold  mine, 
BHP’s Ok Tedi gold and copper mine (the waste from both of which is 
dumped into the Ok Tedi and Strickland rivers which are tributaries of 
the Fly River and form part of the Fly River system) and Lihir Gold 
Limited's gold mine on Lihir Island.  It will examine the extent to 
which the Government of Papua New Guinea may have wittingly (in 
the sense of a prescience as to the possible or probable likelihood of 
deleterious impact) or unwittingly contributed to that degradation as a 
result of its actions or omissions.  
 
Studies of available literature suggest that there has been little attention 
paid  to  the  subject  of  culpability  on  the  part  of  successive  PNG 
governments in matters of environmental damage.  This research will 
contribute to reducing this gap in the literature by focusing on possible 
motives of the PNG government and its actors which precipitated those   ix 
decisions  and  which  resulted  in  environmental  degradation.  The 
discussion will examine the likely motivation of the PNG government 
in its deliberations and decisions and the extent to which corruption 
and incompetence may have played a role.  
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Chapter 1       Introduction: Nature and Context of the Study 
 
1.1  Papua New Guinea; Problems and Challenges 
Papua New Guinea is a country which has been richly endowed by nature 
with an abundance of natural resources (McKinnon, 2002) and it has within its 
borders  some  of  the  world’s  largest  gold/copper  mines  (Thompson  & 
MacWilliam, 1992). Mineral deposits, including oil, copper, and gold, account 
for nearly two-thirds of export earnings and 20% of its national budget is 
made  up  of  the  approximate  $240  million  in  aid  supplied  each  year  by 
Australia (CIA 2006).   
 
It is not unique in having an abundance of natural resources.  Neither is it 
unique  in  its  failure  to  maximise  its  return  in  its  exploitation  of  those 
resources.  Nor is it alone in permitting extensive destruction of its natural 
environment in pursuit of the revenue which those resources are capable of 
providing.   
 
The fact that PNG’s total land area of some 453 thousand sq km (CIA World 
Factbook,  2001)  principally  comprises  (c.  95%)  of  mountain  ranges,  river 
systems,  extensive  forests  with  extreme  access  difficulties  and  marked 
tendencies toward mud slides, volcanic activity, and tsunamis heightens the 
responsibility  of  the  government  of  the  day  to  ensure  that  the  decisions  
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regarding  the  grant  of  mining  licences  are  proactively  managed.    This 
difficulty regarding the terrain and site accessibility has also been used as an 
excuse by the authorities for a lessening of the diligence with which they 
oversee and police the mining activities and it is frequently used as a catch-all 
by  the  mining  companies  in  an  often  successful  attempt  to  reduce  their 
environmentally-protective procedures. 
 
The  challenge  for  PNG  is  that  of  achievement  of  social  and  economic 
development while ensuring the sustainable and environmentally acceptable 
management  of  its  natural  resources  in  the  context  of  the  mining  industry 
being one of the two most significant contributors to the PNG economy (the 
petroleum industry being the other) (Patwa, 2000). 
 
There  are  clear  limits  to  the  extent  of  economic  activity  capable  of  being 
conducted  on  the  environment  (Johnson,  1989)  and  when  these  limits  are 
exceeded  -  whatever  the  cause  -  environmental  pollution  is  precipitated.  
Common (1988) believed that this problem of environmental pollution is a 
result or function of market failure.  Ascher (1999) refers to policy failures in 
natural-resource management practices as those which are societally unsound 
and  he  illustrates  the  extent  and  incidence  of  such  failures.    In  his  view, 
examples of these failures include the underpricing of the franchise allocation 
to  the  resource  exploiter,  the  underpricing  of  the  resource  outputs,  and  a 
failure to ensure competition.  Countries which have common experience in 
this failure to maximise returns on resource exploitation include Indonesia,  
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Ivory Coast, Honduras, Nigeria, Venezuela and many others (ibid.).  Australia 
too experienced a period during which it - sometimes purposely - experienced 
a minimising of the mining royalty returns but did so in most instances in 
return for benefits in other areas such as  facilities and housing construction 
by the mine operators. 
 
Papua New Guinea is, however, perhaps unique in having the concept and 
objective  of  responsible  environmental  management  and  environmental 
protection  enshrined  in  its  Constitution.    This  laudable  inclusion  was 
specifically  the  result  of  the  country's  experience  of  environmental 
degradation ensuing from natural resource exploitation prior to the adoption of 
the Constitution.  In so elevating the concept of environmental protection the 
PNG  government  recognised  the  role  and  importance  of  environmental 
planning and the management of its natural resources and embraced the view 
expressed by Nagel (2002) of environmental protection and conservation of 
nature being principally a function of government.  In September 1975, the 
PNG government passed an environment and conservation policy statement 
with  adoption  of  explicit  reference  to  environmental  concerns  in  the  Five 
National Goals and Directive Principles of the Constitution,  The Fourth Goal 
is stated as being that Papua New Guinea's natural resources and environment 
to be conserved and used for the collective benefit of all of the population and 
that it be replenished for the benefit of future generations.  That Goal also 
adopts the concept that the environment and its sacred, scenic and historical 
qualities be conserved and replenished (SPREP, 1980).  
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Shortly after gaining independence in 1975 and the institution of the Papua 
New  Guinea  Constitution,  the  initial  recognition  of  the  importance  of 
environmental  preservation  was  further  evidenced  by  the  passage  of  three 
pieces of legislation in 1978.  These were as follows;  The Environmental 
Planning  Act,  which  sought  to  provide  the  framework  within  which 
responsible  environmental  planning  procedures  might  be  invoked;    The 
Environmental  Contaminants  Act,  which  encompassed  many  areas  of 
environmental pollution and provided for the licensing of water, air, and land 
pollution and prohibitions and imposition of penalties in relation thereto;  and 
The Conservation Areas Act which provides for the protection of certain areas 
and the promotion of sustained and optimal resource management. 
 
Since gaining independence, there has also been a growing number of policy 
instruments available to PNG governments.  Examples of their deployment in 
many  countries  could  have  been  utilised  by  the  Papua  New  Guinea 
government  in  establishing  environmental  policies.    These  include  such 
concepts  as  the  establishment  of  regulations  and  standards  and  voluntary 
agreements ranging to tradable permits and deposit refund systems (Folmer & 
Gabel,  2000).    Papua  New  Guinea  also  became  a  member  of  such 
international environmental and conservation conventions as The Convention 
on  the  Prevention  of  Marine  Pollution  by  Dumping  of  Wastes  and  Other 
Matter, 1972, and The Convention of Conservation of Nature in the South 
Pacific, 1976, to name but two.    
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In 1995, the Papua New Guinea Government was the recipient of a World 
Bank Economic Recovery Programme loan intended to support a programme 
for that purpose which was part of a broader agenda of structural adjustment.  
In 1997, the Skate Government was elected and this government was found to 
be even more obstinate in its failure to adhere to the disciplines required by 
the Bank - particularly in regard to economic governance matters and forest 
management stipulations.  These forest management requirements created a 
series of confrontations between the Bank and PNG politicians and almost 
derailed the recovery programme in late 1996.  Moreover, the International 
Monetary Fund ("IMF") determined that the  economic governance failures 
were pivotal in what it described as a looming financial crisis (Filer et al., 
2000).  
 
It  is  also  evident  that  the  inhabitants  themselves  are  complicit  in  the 
destruction  which  is  occurring  around  them  -  both  by  sale  of  labour  and 
acceptance by the people of payments from mining companies for reparation 
and local development - and that the 'mutually supportive relationship' which 
has been described as existing ab initio between the people of PNG and the 
environment is under threat.  Rahland & Ecevit (2002) argue that, despite the 
fact that the people of Papua New Guinea have a deep spiritual and emotional 
link with the environment, the lure of short-term benefit is providing a grave 
challenge  to  that  relationship  and,  indeed,  the  traditional  concern  for  the  
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environment  and  the  long-term  effects  of  the  mining  activities  are  being 
ignored in favour of that immediate and tangible ‘good’.   
 
While there is a presumption of relative impotence on the part of indigenous 
peoples in prospective mining development negotiations, they are "far from 
passive  victims  of  domination  but,  without  exception,  they  are  active 
participants in the development process." (Connell & Howitt 1991, p.3)  
 
It  can  be  argued  that  any  appearance  of  complicity  on  the  part  of  the 
inhabitants is a result of necessity and that their support of these companies in 
their destruction of the environment is part of the enigma which requires to be 
resolved.    That  support  by  the  people  is  evidenced  by  the  paradox  of  the 
traditional  land-owners  eager  to  consummate  arrangements  with  resource 
exploitation companies and the voluntary and concurrent sale by the people of 
their labour.  The paradox is compounded by the fact that both factors are 
coincidental with several domestic and international litigation actions against 
these  companies  for  that  very  damage  to  which  the  people  themselves 
contribute and appear to condone by virtue of mining agreements and the sale 
of their labour.   It is a moot point as to whether and to what extent any such 
litigation  should  reasonably  be  directed  toward  and  involve  their  own 
government. 
 
This apparent complicity on the part of the local peoples is further evidenced 
by agreements  such as that signed on April 10, 2001 by Ok Tedi  Mining  
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Limited (OTML 2001), the operator of the Ok Tedi gold and copper mine, 
with the representatives from 19 villages in the Lower Ok Tedi region.  Some 
60,000 people live along the Ok Tedi and Fly River systems in the Western 
province (OTML, 2003).  The area has witnessed extensive environmental 
degradation as a result of the mining activities conducted there - particularly 
those of the Ok Tedi mine.   
 
The agreement of April, 2001 covered the continued operation of the mining 
activities and embodied the pledged support of the indigenous representatives 
for that continuation until the mine life ends in 2010 (OTML Media Release, 
10/4/2001).  This was effected despite the extent and purpose of the litigation 
which was initiated with some success by the local people for compensation 
claimed  as  a  result  of  the  environmental  damage  caused  by  the  mine's 
operation since its inception in 1984.  
 
Moreover, in a statement delivered to the PNG Parliament on September 26, 
2001 by the then PNG Prime Minister, Sir Mekere Morauta, he acknowledged 
that the environmental damage caused by the Ok Tedi mining operation was 
greater than expected when the mine opened and that it was a serious problem 
affecting many people along the Fly River system while, at the same time, 
implicitly  endorsing  support  for  the  continued  operation  of  the  mining 
activities. 
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It is also relevant to note at this time that, as pointed out by Connell and 
Howitt (1991) there have been no instances where the development goals of 
the indigenous peoples have been  successfully  married to the goals of the 
resource exploitation companies.  In fact, they assert, the marginalisation of 
the  local  peoples  because  of  the  mining  activities  has  highlighted  the 
frequency of conflict in the aspirations of the two groups.  
 
Dwyer  (1999)  discussed  the  manner  in  which  a  resource  rent  tax  as 
incorporated  in  the  PNG  fiscal  arrangements  'maximised'  the  mineral  rent 
achieved from the country's resources and that a substantial share of this was 
captured by the government.  However, there is a further complication arising 
from the receipt of these mineral rents from resource exploitation as identified 
by Australian National University Emeritus Professor Helen Hughes (PNG 
Post-Courier, 2004).  She asserts that in immature societies the heavy reliance 
on  natural  resource  exploitation  not  only  precipitates  stagnation  but  the 
resulting  resource  rents  become  siphoned  off  into  corrupt  payments  to 
members  of  Parliament  rather  than  being  used  to  facilitate  infrastructural 
development and the increased dependence on resource rents precipitates the 
relentless pursuit of natural resource exploitation. 
 
Sustainable development has been described as development which secures 
increases  in  the  welfare  of  the  current  generation  without  precipitating  a 
decrease  in  welfare  in  the  future  and  when  attention  to  sustainable 
development  is  ignored  the  relationship  between  economic  growth  and  
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environmental quality is inverted and the stock of environmental capital falls. 
 In order to ensure sustainable economic development it is necessary to bring 
about  income  growth  resulting  in  sustainable  poverty  reduction 
(Sathiendrakumar,  1995).    The  exploitation  of  environmental  capital  stock 
should result, not only in returns for the entities exploiting the resource, but 
also in the growth of social and economic capital for the host country and 
region.  There is a corresponding and overriding requirement to establish a 
balance - particularly in instances of exploitation of nonrenewable resources - 
between the legitimate objective of profit generation through the extraction 
and sale of minerals and the necessity for remedial work and environmental 
regeneration as an essential element of the mining activity.  
 
In  the  case  of  PNG  –  as  in  many  other  LDCs  around  the  world  –  that 
requirement has now assumed a high degree of urgency.  The compromises 
which are reached and the manner in which that conflict is addressed will 
determine not only how history will judge these industrial endeavours but, 
more  importantly,  the  future  development  of  the  local  people  and  their 
environment.  
 
Governments in countries such as PNG, which possess an apparent abundance 
of  natural  resources  with  a  ready  and  extensive  market  in  the  developed 
world, have demonstrated a tendency, because of that fact, to experience a 
period  of  optimism  and  a  degree  of  overconfidence  about  their  future 
prospects.    Coincidentally,  that  optimism  precipitates  a  tendency  to  pay  
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inadequate attention to the responsibility of ensuring that the industrialisation, 
the  establishment  of  alternative  means  of  creating  wealth,  and  the 
advancement of the country is achieved before the nonrenewable resources 
and  the  earning  capacity  from  those  natural  resources  are  exhausted 
(Livingstone, 1989).    
 
The intergenerational responsibility is also a matter frequently sidelined in the 
considerations  of  nonrenewable  resource  extraction  and  the  requirement  to 
pursue a programme of environmental damage measurement has, prior to a 
heightened awareness of the necessity of conservation, often been overlooked 
in investment appraisals of such activities.  Environmental damage is at least 
as  relevant  a  cost  in  considerations  involving  nonrenewable  resource 
extraction  as  are  any  other  cost  considerations  and  for  current  and  future 
generations it is relevant to attempt measurement of the monetary cost of that 
damage and of its remediation (Pearce et al., 1990). 
 
The responsibility in that area of advancement and in the areas of planning 
and management rests with the government authorities.  It is the responsibility 
of such authorities to ensure that the country’s initial reliance on its natural 
resources remains just that, i.e. an initial reliance rather than an ongoing one.  
It is the government’s charge that exploitation of such resources provides a 
basis for the development of long-term supportable economic activity in the 
country.  That purpose, albeit on a broader basis, was intrinsic to the PNG 
Government's  manifesto  and  was  acknowledged  to  be  so  by  the  IMF  in  
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October 2000 in its Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies of the 
Government  of  Papua  New  Guinea.      Yet  the  overriding  requirement  of 
successive  PNG  governments  to  maximise  returns  from  such  activities  in 
order to provide a foundation for the establishment of broad-based industrial 
economy  has  yet  to  be  fulfilled.    The  failure  to  adequately  and  clearly 
delineate operational standards for the resource exploitation activities and to 
monitor  and  police  such  activities  has  made  the  task  of  environmental 
remediation and economic restructuring even more difficult.  
 
The  question  of  the  establishment  of  environmental  standards  is  also  a 
governmental responsibility which is the antecedent and determinant of the 
monitoring  function.    The  environmental  standards  which  are  generally 
acceptable  and  required  in  developed  countries  are  well  known  and 
established.    PNG,  like  other  developing  countries,  seems  to  adopt  a 
somewhat schizophrenic approach to the question of environmental standards 
particularly  in  regard  to  such  resource  extraction  activities  as  forestry  and 
mining.    Most  multinational  corporations  which  operate  such  activities  in 
developing  countries  are  well  aware  of  their  attendant  responsibilities.  
Nevertheless,  without  an  adequate  level  of  supervision  and  policing, 
companies may succumb to the temptation to ignore environmental protection 
requirements and the extent to which a multinational corporation operating in 
a  developing  country  is  willing  to  comply  with  environment-related 
stipulations  will  depend,  not  only  on  the  costs  and  benefits  involved  
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(Dunning,  1993),  but  also  on  the  level  of  policing  and  existence  and 
application of punitive costs.   
  
A  mineral  resource  rent  is  the  product  net  value  after  deduction  of  all 
necessary costs (Garnaut and Ross, 1983). However, the search for such rents, 
and in some cases government subsidies or inducements to facilitate mining 
activities  in  order  that  a  resource  rent  be  created,  can  also,  of  itself,  be 
sufficient to precipitate the environmental degradation.  This can occur while, 
at the same time ignoring the 'first principle of resource economics' (Ascher, 
1999.  p.  16)  for  extraction  from  public  lands  which  is  described  as  the 
responsibility to levy the full value of the extracted resources. 
 
That  natural  resource  exploitation,  particularly  in  the  case  of  Papua  New 
Guinea,  is  mostly  conducted  in  inaccessible  locations  exacerbates  the 
difficulties of monitoring and policing the activities concerned by virtue of the 
physical  difficulty  in  regularly  accessing  these  areas  for  assessment  and, 
consequently, ensuring remedial recommendations or requirements are being 
fulfilled.  Moreover, the fact of such remoteness creates, at the most basic 
level, a situation whereby any question of protection of the environment must, 
by definition, be reactive rather than proactive in nature.   
 
The very nature of the remote location of the sites of resource exploitation and 
the access difficulties presented by the mountainous and jungle terrain mean 
that, by the time knowledge of the damage reaches a monitoring and policing  
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authority,  it  is  too  late  to  engage  in  pre-emptive  environmental  protection 
discussions – much less, action.  To overcome these difficulties there would 
be required either the permanent presence of appropriately-trained monitors 
with the requisite authority to enforce compliance, or rapid access facilities 
such as helicopters and rough-terrain vehicles manned by qualified personnel. 
 However, the acquisition of such equipment and training would be predicated 
on availability of extensive funding. 
 
In most cases in PNG, those most affected by the environmental damage are 
those least equipped to protest, deal with, or restrict the activity.  They are 
those  who  cannot  object  to  the  consignment  of  the  function  of  ‘natural 
resource management’ to the position of being hostage to the achievement of 
other objectives.  These other objectives are those desired by a government 
with priorities which give little emphasis to the function of protection of the 
environment and companies for which the preservation of the environment is 
a  subject  of  concern  only  by  dint  of  the  fact  of  the  potential  consequent 
financial or public relations fallout.  Furthermore, because of the frequency of 
the  occurrence  of  'settlement'  agreements  and  the  incidence  of  payoffs  to 
various  groups  within  the  affected  areas,  there  appears  to  be  a  growing 
tendency on the part of the people of PNG, as asserted by Rahland & Ecevit 
(2002), toward acceptance of the trade-offs required in terms of the long-term 
damage to the environment in order to secure the short-term benefits on offer - 
rather  than  preparation  of  and  adherence  to  a  pro-active,  ecologically-
responsible plan of resource management.  
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This propensity is a direct result of interest group pressures being brought to 
bear by the proponents of the exploitation activities and, in turn, the various 
ministries and groups which stand to benefit from the decision to permit such 
proposals to proceed.  The benefits which ensue serve the interests of a small 
number  of  people  in  each  individual  case  whilst  the  abdication  of  the 
environmental concerns causes damage to a great number of people for an 
extended period of time - perhaps irrevocably.   
 
In this context, it is  contended by Wilson (1990, p.11) that interest group 
activity is most likely to develop when "costs and benefits are concentrated on 
a small number and are also significant".  And, as stated by Ascher (1999), the 
general power of individual government officials and their units is determined 
by their control over the allocation of the natural resource wealth and the cash 
flows  involved  in  resource  exploitation.    In  that,  there  is  a  separate  and 
distinct  benefit  to  the  officials  concerned,  other  than  the  objectives  of  the 
resource development proposal itself.  That is the fact of the discretionary 
power entailed in the decision-making process and that power to assign may 
be  more  compelling  for  them  than  is  the  possibility  to  enrich  themselves 
physically from the allocation of the natural-resource wealth. 
 
The  extent  to  which  these  influences  play  a  part  in  the  decision-making 
process of the PNG Government in the context of the mining industry is to be 
determined.  The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia  
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and the Pacific (UNESCAP) has stated in its 1996 analysis of the National 
Institutional  Arrangements  for  Integrating  Environmental  Concerns  Into 
Policy  Decision-Making  Processes  that,  in  regard  to  small-scale  alluvial 
operators in the PNG mining industry, i.e. alluvial gold-mining operations, the 
PNG  Department  of  Environment  and  Conservation  had  literally  turned  a 
blind eye to those operators and had allowed them to take advantage of this 
provision because of the chronic shortage of monitoring staff.   
 
Added to this chronic lack of people to monitor and police the industry is the 
fact that, under the Environmental Planning Act, the developers of a mining or 
development  project  are  permitted  to  voluntarily  prepare  and  submit  an 
environmental management plan.   UNESCAP also states that, to date (i.e. 
1996),  most  environmental  plans  have  been  of  the  'voluntary'  type  and, 
therefore, not fully debated by local government or the PNG Parliament and 
considerably more likely to be self-serving toward the developers.   
 
Moreover, the PNG Environmental Protection Authority, which is, in itself, no 
more  than  the  physical  embodiment  of  the  aspirations  enshrined  in  the 
Constitution,  does  not  compel  the  incorporation  of  any  environmental 
protection measures in a development scheme.  The Act only recommends the 
consideration  of  environmental  protection  and  management  procedures.  
These requirements are clearly inadequate in terms of the establishment of an 
acceptable level of environmental control or monitoring.  The growth in social 
awareness of the problem of environmental degradation continues to focus the  
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attention of the PNG government in determining ways in which the matter can 
be addressed (McKinnon, 2002).  However, the legislation enacted to provide 
the basis of that protection is more often honoured in the breach than in the 
observance. 
 
Since the re-election of Sir Michael Somare (variously referred to as the father 
of the nation due to the fact of his having been PNG's first prime minister; or 
the Chief) to power in 2002, the expectations and aspirations, common to 
many observers at the time, that his re-election would lead to a renaissance for 
Papua New Guinea, increasingly appear to be unfounded.   In 2005, following 
continuing and growing evidence of societal and developmental dysfunction 
over many years and a recognition of deterioration in economic management, 
fiscal management, political instability, and quality of governance, the Somare 
Government introduced what is referred to as the Medium Term Development 
Strategy 2005-2010 (MTDS).  The MTDS is intended to be a programme for 
recovery  and  development  of  the  economy  having  as  its  objectives  good 
governance, export-driven economic growth, rural development, and poverty 
reduction (Orere, 2005 a).   
 
The fact that these acknowledgements and statements of objectives constitute 
a statement of pre-determined ambition since the date of PNG's independence 
should not be allowed to diminish what is ostensibly a well-intentioned and 
desperately  needed  programme.    Nevertheless,  it  has  already  come  under 
criticism as being a product of 'deadening ideology' in an attempt to put a  
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gloss on what the Government is trying to do while glossing over what it has 
failed to do.  The relevant economic context is described as terribly serious 
and getting worse (Patience, 2005 a).   
 
The promises of Sir Michael's predecessor, Sir Mekere Morauta, in July 1999, 
inter alia, to restore integrity to state institutions and stabilise the kina and the 
national budget were undertakings also given by Sir Michael in the lead-up to 
his re-election.  However, the kina
1, having depreciated against the United 
States dollar (US$) by over 70% from 1988 to 1998 (source: World Bank 
Report, No. 19388-PNG, 1999), has again depreciated by a further 20% in 
2002  (O'Callaghan,  2002)  adding  a  growing  urgency  to  the  necessity  to 
revitalise the economy.   
 
These  events  create  another  inherent  difficulty  in  ensuring  satisfactory 
monitoring and control of resource exploitation and it does not augur well for 
the  continuing  constructive  management  of  the  nation's  resources  and 
environment.    Indeed,  the  problems  experienced  in  such  monitoring  and 
control contribute toward the creation of further difficulties precipitating a 
vicious  cycle.    In  a    2004  report  upgrading  PNG's  currency  rating,  the 
international ratings agency, Standard & Poor, stated that the upgrade was 
predicated, inter alia, on the expectation of increased "technical, financial, and 
security  assistance  from  Australia"  and  qualified  its  judgement  with  the 
                                                 
1   The kina is the national currency of Papua New Guinea.   The 2003  annual average 
kina/US$ exchange rate was US$3.54 (The Economist PNG Report, Jan. 2004)   
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caution that, because of PNG's failure to broaden its economic and revenue 
base,  its  economic  and  fiscal  performance  remained  highly  sensitive  to 
fluctuations  in  commodity  prices  (The  Australian,  23  Dec.  2004).    It  is 
fortunate for PNG, therefore, that Australia does, in fact, see itself as having 
"compelling strategic interests in a stable and prosperous Papua New Guinea" 
(AusAID Annual Report 2003-2004 p.29). 
 
In fact, Australia, desperate to obviate the possibility of the disintegration of 
its nearest neighbour, provides aid to PNG at a level of about 20 per cent of 
PNG's total aid budget revenue and, despite appending structural and political 
reform conditions on further aid grants, there seems little possibility of such 
aid disappearing (Forbes, 2002). 
 
There  remains  a  growing  and  continuing  critical  emphasis  being  directed 
toward both the mining activities in PNG and the reducing attractiveness of 
PNG as an investment location with a corresponding reduction in exploration 
expenditure.  There have been,  as  a consequence, further indications from 
government sources of a reduction in environmental protection measures and 
pre-requisites in the mining sector in PNG.  This is evidenced by the recent 
pronouncements  of  the  PNG  Government  with  regard  to  increasing  the 
inducements  to  potential  resource  exploitation  operators  (Robins,  2002). 
Robins also alludes to the evidence of a growing eagerness on the part of the 
PNG government to attract more investment in the area of exploration and 
mining.    
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The PNG Government has further announced that mining taxes will be revised 
in order to revive investor interest in the resources sector with some taxes 
being  abolished  and  others  reduced  (ibid.).    According  to  PNG  Mines 
Minister,  Sam  Akoitai,  three  of  the  principal  projects  under  review  for 
imminent approval were gold prospects (ibid.).   
 
This renewed desire for investment in the resource sector appears to follow a 
pattern:  following the closure of the Panguna copper mine on Bougainville in 
May,  1989,  which  was  responsible  for  the  pollution  of  land,  rivers,  and 
contiguous marine areas, and the resultant severe depletion of tax revenues 
and  exports;  the  PNG  Government  was  forced  to  relax  its  already  weak 
environmental standards for the BHP-operated Ok Tedi mine.   
 
"Government representatives have openly said that they cannot now 
afford to stop the Ok Tedi mine discharging huge amounts of waste 
into the Fly River system or prevent the siltation of most of the upper 
tributaries.    The  unintended  result  of  the  attempt  by  the  BRA 
(Bougainville Revolutionary Army) to end the mining and clean up 
their river systems has led to government decisions which will cause, 
at the very least, the destruction of the Upper Fly River system in the 
Western Province"  (Thompson & MacWilliam, 1992, p. 180).   
 
As a result, by 1992, production had again escalated dramatically and, in that 
year, over one billion dollars worth of gold and silver was exported from PNG  
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mines.(Lipscomb et al., 1998) with the attendant environmental damage which 
is addressed in Chapter 4.. 
 
That  this  continued  pursuit  of  further  exploitation  of  the  country's  natural 
resources should occur at this time should also  provide the opportunity to 
ensure the imposition of environmentally-protective measures and a system of 
implementation  of  a  full  and  rigourous  monitoring  and  policing  system 
capable of ensuring that any future development projects will be conducted in 
a manner which precipitates a minimum (or what might be described as an 
optimal) level of damage to the environment.   
 
1.2  Aims and Structure of the Thesis     
Despite PNG's ostensible dedication to responsible management in the areas 
of  pollution  and  natural  resources  and  the  considerable  financial  and 
administrative aid received; in the space of little more than half a century, 
while seeming to address these elements of environmental policy, the PNG 
government has arguably permitted and witnessed a level of degradation in 
natural resource exploitation unprecedented in such a short period of time, i.e. 
in  less  than  thirty  years.    That  the  degradation  remains  unredressed 
compounds the issue although the fact that this redress has been lacking is in 
many instances partially due to the fact that it is only relatively recently that 
the theoretical association of development and protection of the environment 
in a social and political as well as an economic context has been successfully 
established (Adams, 1990).   
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The approach employed in the thesis begins with an examination in Chapter 2 
of the historical background of mining activities in PNG and the growth in the 
resulting environmental impact.  This is followed in Section 2.2 by an analysis 
of the interaction of the mining industry and its impact with the concept of 
land tenure in PNG and the PNG Constitution.  In Section 2.3 the political 
context  affecting  election to  public  office  and  the  impact  on  the  decision-
making processes relating to the mining industry is examined.  Sections 2.4 
and 2.5 deal with environmental pollution as an externality and policy design 
and implementation relating to the environment. 
 
The  literature  review  in  Chapter  3  is  followed  by  an  analysis  of  the 
environmental  impact  resulting  from  the  operation  of  three  PNG  mining 
operations.  Examples  and  evidence  of  the  degradation  are  presented  in 
Chapter 4.  As will be discussed later, the initial exploitation, prior to the 
1950s, of its natural resources was conducted in a manner which was, by 
comparison  with  later  conduct,  environmentally friendly.    By  contrast,  the 
damage done by exploitation in the period leading up to and following the 
1970s is enormous by comparison (Susapu & Crispin, 2001).  
 
The overall field of study is determined beginning with the research question, 
i.e. to determine the most likely motivational forces at play in the decision 
making processes of the Papua New Guinea Government in the context of the 
licences  and  authorities  granted  by  it  for  mineral  resource  exploitation.   
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Previous research in the context of the mining industry in PNG has tended to 
concentrate  on  the  description  and  analysis  of  the  fact  of  the  degradation 
which has resulted from the exploitation of the mineral resource.   
 
They  have  tended  to  avoid  attempting  an  explanation  for  the  reasons  and 
justifications  as  to  why  it  would  be  that  successive  democratically  elected 
governments  would  apparently  knowingly  issue  authorities  to  mining 
companies which, in the process of exploitation of the resource, precipitate 
environmental  damage  to  a  degree  which  has  been  stated  by  many  to  be 
unacceptable and potentially irreparable. 
 
The research methodology will involve an analysis of the current position in 
regard to each of the three mining activities being those of the Porgera gold 
mine, the Ok Tedi mine, and the Lihir gold mine.   The reasons for the choice 
of  these  particular  activities  are  as  a  result  of  the  relative  abundance  of 
literature and analysis on the subjects, the general academic acceptability of 
the main body of that work; and the very extent of the environmental damage 
already  caused  by  these  activities.  The  extent  of  that  environmental 
degradation which has occurred as a result of the operation of these mining 
activities will be examined to determine the level to which such degradation 
might  have  been  anticipated  had  a  proactive  management  programme  of 
natural  resource  exploitation  been  implemented  prior  to  the  granting  of 
licences.   
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1.3  Conclusion 
While  having  experienced  a  high  level  of  environmental  damage  in  the 
resource exploitation activities in specific areas, PNG is a country which still 
retains a relatively unspoiled and sparsely populated environment.  However, 
as is evidenced in Chapter 4, the environment is increasingly coming under 
threat and the acceleration of that pressure over the recent past - particularly in 
the last 15 years – is such as to suggest that the threat to the environment will 
increase rather than diminish.  
 
Moreover, this apparent trend regarding the environment is not at odds with 
the views expressed by Martin & Schumann (1997) on resource exploitation 
since  the  United  Nations  1992  conference  on  the  environment  and 
development in Rio de  Janeiro.  They opine that the global pattern in the 
context has not changed since that time. 
 
From 1990 to 1997, exploration expenditure in PNG averaged around US$40 
million per annum but then declined sharply to a level of c. US$10 million in 
2001  and  the  prognosis  is  for  further  declines  in  the  future.    The  PNG 
Chamber of Mines and Petroleum projections (PDAC Paper, March 2002) 
indicate  an  expected  total  decline  in  annual  gold  production from  existing 
mines from a production of 74.5 tonnes in 2000 to 0 tonnes in 2012.  This 
decline in production is allied to the reduction in exploration expenditure.   It 
is  this  decline  in  exploration  expenditure  which  has  led  to  the  PNG  
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Government’s declaration regarding the reduction of mining taxation and an 
increase in the incentives for companies considering further exploration. 
 
The ecosystems affected by the mining industry in particular are under a threat 
which is dual in nature and compounded in its effects.  Forestry operations, 
leading to deforestation of vast tracts of territory, result in the topsoil being 
progressively washed away in those areas because the 'anchor' for the topsoil, 
i.e., the forests, is no longer present.  Rahland & Ecevit (2002) estimate that 
PNG forests currently available for logging will be fully exploited within 25 
years if logging continues at its current rate.   
 
Similarly,  while  the  target  of  the  mining  industry  is  the  mineral  wealth 
beneath the forests rather than the forests themselves; in order to access the 
minerals,  there  is  required  to  occur  large-scale  clearance  of  the  forests 
resulting  in  further  erosion  of  topsoil  with  flow-on  effects  on  lower  level 
systems, both terrestrial and aquatic. 
 
The preservation of the environment is fraught with difficulties common to 
lesser-developed  countries  such  as  a  population  still  largely  dependent  on 
agriculture - 88% of PNG's population being estimated to live in rural areas 
(Pitts, 2002) - the proliferation of as many as 850 disparate local languages 
among the population (Anderson & Moramoro, 2002), a declining per-capita 
gross national product (partly due to the fact that population growth rates have 
exceeded economic growth for the past two decades {current population is  
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stated  to  be  5.19  million  according  to  the  PNG  census  return  of  2000),  
economic decline in recent years, and a declining export-generated revenue 
base albeit with a growing dependency on commodity exports - the mining 
industry represented 44% of export income in 2000 and approximately 15% of 
GDP.  PNG produced 74.5 tonnes of gold in 2000 and 67 tonnes in 2001 
(Anderson & Moramoro, 2002).   
 
Along with a growing dependency on resource-based government revenues, 
PNG also manifests a growing dependency on international aid - particularly 
from Australia.  It is, therefore, both ironic and inauspicious to note that those 
countries which are the highest per capita recipients of aid have manifested 
the slowest rate of economic growth (Hughes, 2005).  International Monetary 
Fund economist, Sanjeev Gupta, has empirically determined that for every 
extra dollar of aid given to aid-dependent countries, the recipient governments 
raise 28 cents less in tax (Gupta et al., 2004).   Of further concern, Gupta et al. 
have found that the more corrupt a country, the more the revenues of that 
country decline as the grant aid it receives increases. 
 
In keeping with the views expressed by Hughes, Gupta et al. interpret their 
data as implying that the provision of aid to countries with weak or inefficient 
institutional administration should be accompanied by directives and policy 
generation designed to strengthen domestic institutions rather than eliminating 
or limiting the provision of aid to those countries. 
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In view of the extent of the evidence of the environmental degradation in 
Papua  New  Guinea,  the  dramatic  deterioration  in  economic  conditions  in 
recent years, and, ironically, the economy's growing, rather than diminishing, 
dependency on primary commodity exports, including gold; the question of 
ensuring that the exploitation of the country's natural resources is effected in a 
manner  which  is  sustainable  and  that,  coincidentally,  the  environment  is 
protected, becomes one of both extreme urgency and extreme complexity. 
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Chapter 2  Overview of PNG Economy;   Developmental and 
Environmental Concerns & Political Context 
2.1  Historical Background of the Mining Industry in PNG 
   
Figure 2.1 Map of PNG and Subject Mining Locations 
 
In order to give context to the current situation regarding resource exploitation 
and environmental degradation in PNG, it is necessary to examine the relevant 
historical background. 
 
In  1901,  Australia  assumed  administrative  responsibility  for  the  territory 
known  as  New  Guinea  and  in  1905  the  formal  transfer  to  Australian 
jurisdiction was effected.   The two territories of Papua and the eastern part of 
the island of New Guinea - which became the Independent State of Papua 
New Guinea (PNG) - was formally recognised by the international community 
Ok Tedi mine 
Porgera mine 
Lihir gold mine  
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on the 16th of September 1975.  Having been colonised at various times in its 
history (by the Dutch in the early part of the 19th century, and the Germans 
and British in the latter part of the 19th century); in the 20th century the 
principal  influence  came  from  Australia.    Since  independence  for  PNG  in 
1975, Australia has also become one of its largest aid donors and it is, in fact, 
the  principal  foreign  beneficiary  of  Australian  aid  with  an  estimated  aid 
package for the period 2002-2003 amounting to over $351 million (AusAID). 
  
 
Australia was also the principal initial source of interest and actors in the gold 
mining industry in Papua New Guinea.  In the 1880s gold in economically 
viable quantities began to be discovered in PNG - principally by Queensland 
expatriates (Anderson & Moramoro, 2002) - and was followed, in the ensuing 
30-40 years, by an increasing concentration of gold exploration throughout the 
territory.  There followed the instigation of a major dredging operation in the 
Bulolo valley in Morobe Province which further precipitated small open-pit 
mining in the Wau region in the mid-1900s (Susapu & Crispin, 2001).  
 
The initial results of these discoveries and production were an expansion of 
the awareness of the gold mining opportunities and the exploration activities 
and  a  move  from  alluvial  gold  mining  to  mechanised  mining  operations 
beginning with the dredging operations in the Bulolo valley.  The activities of 
the alluvial gold miners over the period to the early nineteen thirties involved 
more environmentally considerate methods such as placer panning and water  
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jet  extraction,  which  had  tangible  beneficial  effects  on  the  embryonic 
economy.  Whilst there continued, and continues, to be an extensive mining 
activity in the extraction of alluvial gold
2 which is encouraged both internally 
and  internationally  through  such  support  mechanisms  as  AusAID;  the 
expansion  of  large-scale  corporate  mining  methods  and  operations  in  the 
ensuing  decades  witnessed  a  move  toward  exploitation  of  lower  grade 
deposits  with  the  attendant  requirement  for  increased  mechanisation  and  a 
continuation  of  the  trend  toward  corporatisation  of  mining  entities.  This 
corporatisation  also  involved  an  expanding  international  presence  and  a 
growing  evidence  of  a  diminishing  regard  for  the  environment  as  the 
environment was regarded as a free good.   
 
Nevertheless,  the  continued  development  of  the  resources  sector  in  PNG 
became an ever more important aspect of the overall PNG economy and, in 
1998, the resources sector constituted approximately 26% of the PNG GDP 
and 70% of exports (AusAID, 2000).  As a result, this growing concentration 
of large-scale mining methods had begun to increase the social cost in terms 
of  growing  environmental  impact  and  damage.    The  growing  cost  of 
exploration  and  mine  construction,  because  of  the  mountainous  and 
inhospitable terrain, (the total cost of exploration and mining is estimated to 
be around 400 per cent more in PNG than in Australia, (ibid.)) resulted in 
                                                 
2   [Susapu and Crispin, 2001 & Rahland & Ecevit, 2002, p.15, estimate that up to 
80,000 miners were still involved in this activity in 2001]  
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progressively more exploitative approaches to the gold-mining activities by 
the exploration companies. 
 
On  January  20,  2000,  the  World  Bank  wrote  to  Sir  Michael  Somare’s 
predecessor, Sir Mekere Morauta (in response to Sir Mekere’s invitation), to 
the  effect  that  it  was  examining  the  Ok  Tedi  Mining  Limited  treatise  on 
retrospective mine waste management.   
 
In that correspondence, the Bank, agreeing to provide financial assistance, 
stated that the assistance was being provided in order to assist the Government 
in  dealing  with  the  broader  issues  of  the  Government’s  social  and 
environmental  stewardship  and  responsibility.    The  World  Bank  also 
expressed  the  view  that  one  of  the  critical  success  factors  with  regard  to 
natural  resource  sector  projects  was  that  of  delineating  institutional 
responsibilities between governments and the private sector to provide support 
for  social  and  community  development  activities  (housing,  water  and 
sanitation, health care, education, training and enterprise development, and 
infrastructure  such  as  access  roads  and  bridges),  either  to  mitigate  social 
impacts or to improve social cohesion (World Bank Discussion Paper, No. 
384, 1998). 
 
The Bank recommended that the opportunity should be grasped and developed 
to build an international policy approach both contributive from the point of  
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view  of  funding  and  to  provide  guidance  and  administration  assistance  in 
terms of monitoring and policing. 
 
2.2  Land Tenure, the Constitution, and Mining 
For indigenous peoples the land is evidently the central focus of their social 
identity (Connell & Howitt, 1991).  In the case of the peoples of Papua New 
Guinea,  land  is  viewed  as  an  essential  part  of  their  heritage  and  is  of 
paramount  importance  in  matters  of  their  cultural  integrity  (Gaudi,  1999). 
Ninety-five per cent of all the land in PNG is still held under the system of 
customary ownership (Pitts, 2002).  The traditional nature of land ownership 
in PNG is based on the occupation and usage of the land according to the 
customs of the land-owning group - which "in all cases, is the clan." (Donigi, 
1994, p.32).  Each clan or sub-clan is the owner of sections of land for garden 
use or as hunting bush in the vicinity of the hamlet in which they live (Berndt 
& Lawrence, 1971). 
 
Mugambwa & Amankwah (2002) believed the land in PNG to be the basis of 
economic and social interaction for most of the country and that its added role 
as a complex cultural, religious, and psychological factor in PNG life impacts 
also on its legal standing.  The question of traditional ownership of resource-
rich land areas also goes to the heart of such  matters as national identity, 
democracy, constitutionality, and legitimacy of government processes and that 
disputes  about  land  ownership  constitute  a  challenge  to  identity  and  
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sovereignty within the state rather than between nation states which they see 
as imagined communities (Howitt et al. 1996). 
 
The  Latin  legal  maxim,  cujus  est  solum  ejus  usque  coelum  et  ad  inferos 
(which, roughly translated, means; he to whom the land belongs, to him also 
belongs to the sky and beneath the land) encapsulates the concept of land 
ownership under the common law of England.  Despite this and the fact of the 
adoption of English common law by the PNG constitution in 1975; legal and 
polemic argument has continued in PNG as to whether that ownership extends 
to the sub-soil resources.  The principal protagonists for the contention that 
such extension of ownership does not exist have tended to be foreign advisers 
to the government and the mining industry (Donigi, 1994).  Nevertheless, as 
contended by Donigi, the indigenous landowners' ownership is supported by 
international law, constitutional law, Commonwealth legal precedents, United 
States laws, and the common law of England. 
 
As stated, it is estimated that approximately 95% of the land in PNG is owned 
in this (customary) way (Patwa, 2000: Donigi, 1992; Pitts, 2002) and property 
ownership  and  transfer  matters  are  further  exacerbated  by  the  difficulties 
faced in the function of environmental planning.  Moreover, the land tenure 
system varies from place to place within the country and there are different 
systems of land rights applicable to different categories of land use (Anderson 
& Moramoro, 2002).  In general, land ownership lies with a local group and  
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membership of the group depends upon such things as descent, residence and 
participation in activities common to the group.   
 
This system can be referred to as the 'customary ownership’ system.  The land 
cannot  be  sold  or  leased  other  than  in  accordance  with  customary  law 
although,  under  the  Mining  Act  1992,  the  State  purports  to  guarantee  the 
licensee  of  the  mining  rights,  the  right  to  exploit  minerals,  and,  thereby, 
purports to override customary ownership.  From this and associated matters 
arises the difficulty of the question of the ownership of the minerals beneath 
the  surface.    Donigi  (1994,  p.32)  asserts  that  ownership  of  the  "sub-soil 
resources by landowners is based, since time immemorial, on possession of 
the land surface." and, therefore, all non-government land is 'customary land', 
the  occupation  and  usage  of  which  is  governed  according  to  traditional 
custom.   
 
Successive governments - aided by, and in the interests of, the mining industry 
- have argued that such possession of the land does not give corresponding 
ownership rights to the sub-soil resources.  The PNG Constitution – as with 
any sovereign and democratic country’s constitution - is intended to serve as 
the  ultimate  arbiter  of  the  nation’s  system  of  justice,  the  rights  of  the 
individual against the state, and the manner of the administration of justice 
and the law.   
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The PNG Constitution has adopted the English rules of equity and common 
law - except in so far as they were not in conflict with the customary law of 
PNG.      Further,  English  law  recognises  that  ownership  of  the  land 
encompasses  all  that  lies  above  and  below  the  surface.    The  obvious  and 
inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that there is prima facie evidence as to 
the ownership of the  sub-soil resources which render the assertions of the 
PNG Government to be seen to be, at best, inaccurate.   
 
This  also  raises  the  more  vexed  question,  sometimes  surreptitiously 
promulgated by PNG governments, of the supremacy of the Constitution of 
Papua  New  Guinea  and  whether  it  can  be  altered  by  legislation  as  was 
attempted by the 1992 Mining Act.  The PNG Constitution is the supreme law 
of Papua New Guinea and all subsidiary legislation is subject to its provisions 
(Donigi 1994).  This fact opens to question the legitimacy of legislation by the 
State  (such  as  the  mining  legislation  referred  to  above)  relating  to  the 
ownership of sub-soil resources in so far as the legislation attempts to subvert 
or alter those sections of the Constitution which confer those rights on the 
customary  owners  of  the  land.    Moreover,  the  Constitution  states  that  no 
interest in property (including land and any minerals as part of that land) may 
be compulsorily acquired by the State except by act of parliament and any 
such  legislation  is,  as  stated,  subject  to  the  Constitution.    It  is,  therefore, 
arguable,  and  argued,  that  any  mining  legislation  which  purports  to  grant 
rights to mineral resources under customary land or purporting to vest in the  
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State the sub-soil resources is, ipso facto, unconstitutional and, consequently, 
potentially voidable.   
 
Land  disputes  in  Papua  New  Guinea  -  which  are  common  -  are  a  further 
complication  in  the  matter  of  environmental  planning  and  they  very  often 
arise as a direct result of the perceived appreciation in the value of the land 
consequent  upon  the  mining  activity  itself.    These  disputes  often  revolve 
around  the  question  of  distribution  of  benefits  resulting  from  the  mining 
exploration activities.  Land tenure agreements are, therefore, a factor with 
which  mining  operations  must  also  contend.    Traditional  land  tenure 
agreements  normally  provide  members  of  a  particular  clan  or  group  with 
access to some land which will thus provide a degree of security, work, and a 
means  of  earning  some  income.    Each  village  is  associated  with  a  clan  - 
dominated by the male members - and house-sites are handed down from the 
father to his sons (Kaberry, 1971). 
 
There  is  also  the  matter  of  conserving  the  general  biodiversity  of  PNG,  a 
challenge which is made more difficult by consecutive governments' fear of 
the alienation of particular segments of the community with the result that 
there  are  few  totally  protected  areas  in  PNG.   There  have  only  been four 
national parks established in total since before PNG independence (Lipscomb 
et al., 1998) including the McAdam National Park which is an area of some 
2076 hectares located between the Wau and Bulolo Rivers in the  Morobe 
Province.    (The  Morobe  Province  is  Southeast  of  the  Western  Highlands  
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Province – the site of the Ok Tedi mine.  This was also the location of small 
open-pit mining activities in the mid-1900s.)  
 
These  difficulties  have  been  exacerbated  by  the  growth  of  the  PNG 
population,  the  desire  on  the  part  of  many  for  'Westernisation'  of  their 
lifestyles,  a  growing  lawlessness  among  many  of  the  inhabitants,  and  a 
population  which  has  become  accustomed  to  the  immediate  benefits  and 
gratification available on the securing of an agreement with a mining or a 
logging company.  Securing such an agreement is necessarily the result of 
negotiation between the mining company, the government representatives, and 
the traditional landowners.  In most such negotiations, the national interests 
are  diametrically  opposed  to  those  of  the  landowners  (Connell  &  Howitt, 
1991)  and  the  diverging  interests  have  disrupted  donor-funded  projects 
because of landowners demanding compensation (Kewa, 2004).   
 
The fact of communal land ownership has also been identified as one of the 
principal causes of deprivation in rural communities including those of PNG.  
It was asserted by Professor Helen Hughes that the communal land ownership 
described  above  had  contributed  to  corruption  -  particularly  in  regard  to 
timber exports - and that it had precipitated substantial losses in tax revenues 
and  to  environmental  degradation  in  PNG  (Cheung,  2004).    Indeed,  the 
situation is so fraught with difficulty that any organisation wishing to exploit 
the country's natural resources must negotiate with an indeterminate number  
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of  customary  landowners,  most  of  whom  are  prepared  to  abandon  their 
resources for the right price (Filer et al., 2000) 
 
 
2.3  Political Context 
In  1962, a visiting United Nations mission joined the then chorus of world 
opinion in pressuring Australia to begin the process of preparing the two parts 
of the territory of Papua and New Guinea for independence (refer Figure 2.1). 
 In 1964, a House of Assembly was formed consisting of 64 members.  Self-
government  was  introduced  in  1973  and  in  September,  1975,  PNG  was 
granted  full  independence.    It  thus  became  an  independent  parliamentary 
democracy within the British Commonwealth with a unicameral system of 
government but based on the Westminster model.  The British monarch as 
head  of  state,  on  the  recommendation  of  the  PNG  parliament,  appoints  a 
governor general.  Parliamentary elections are held at five year intervals; the 
parliament  then  elects  a  prime  minister  who  then  chooses  the  ministerial 
appointees.    
 
In 1976, there was established a provincial system of government with the 
formation of 19 separate provinces and a national capital district – each with 
its  own  provincial  assembly  and  each  requiring  its  own  electoral  process.  
That  system  was  described  by  Thompson  (1994)  as  rendering  the  task  of 
national resource planning almost impossible.  In the event, many of these 
assemblies were thereafter suspended for mismanagement or corruption and it  
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was realised that further reform was needed.  Poor prioritisation of reform 
initiatives are seen to have precipitated economic and social failures in PNG 
while measures which were deemed unimportant or nonproductive for PNG's 
development were implemented (Orere, 2005 b). 
 
The  provincial  system  was  radically  altered  as  a  result  of  reforms  which 
followed the Constitutional Review (Micah) Commission in 1995 set up to 
examine  the  mismanagement  and  corruption  in  the  provincial  assembly 
system.  Despite these reforms, provincial assemblies still abound comprising 
of national members from each province.  Each provincial assembly includes 
a governor for the province who is elected at general elections held every five 
years.  There also exist over 150 local councils (Lipscomb et al., 1998). 
 
The national political scene is such that each successive government in PNG 
has been a tenuous amalgam of disparate interests and allegiances and no one 
party has ever governed in its own right.  The parties themselves tend to be 
identified by their or their members' regional base or the influence of their 
leaders or "big men" rather than subscription to a common ideology.  There 
are as many as several thousand 'political' or tribal communities in PNG yet 
the national parliament can accommodate the elected nominees of no more 
than approximately 100 of these tribes at any one time (Colin Filer in Howitt 
et al., 1996; Filer et al., 2000).  The question of membership of a particular 
political party is considerably less critical than the ability of an individual 
parliamentary  member  to  distribute  the  greatest  possible  amount  of  
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government  resources  to  a  local  constituency  (Filer  et  al.,  2000).  The 
application of the concept of nationhood to such a state can be viewed at best, 
therefore, as the statement of an aspiration.  
 
In 2002, PNG held its sixth general election since gaining independence in 
1975 and was contested by over 40 political parties.  The prime minister, Sir 
Michael  Somare,  whose  current  party  is  the  National  Alliance,  formed  a 
government coalition made up of 13 political parties and some independent 
members of parliament (The Economist, PNG Country Profile, 2003). 
 
The parliamentary election process, which is non-compulsory, is on a first-
past-the-post basis but is fraught with difficulty as a result of the large number 
of candidates who regularly stand for election - in the 2002 general election, 
there  were  almost  3,000  candidates  in  contention  for  little  more  than  100 
parliamentary seats.  {The full complement of members of parliament is 109 
(The  Economist,  PNG  Report,  October  2003)}.  It  is  not  uncommon  for 
members of parliament to be elected with less than 10% of the total vote.  For 
purposes of splitting the vote along tribal lines, there are frequently candidates 
put forward from each tribe in a constituency with a resultant dissemination of 
votes. These difficulties are compounded in as much as the larger clans appear 
to  get  parliamentary  representation  at  the  expense  of  the  smaller  clans 
(Donigi,  1994).    Corruption  throughout  the  process  of  election  is  also 
widespread  and  disaffection  at  election  time,  and  generally  in  regard  to 
elections, is common.    
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The  proliferation  of  candidates,  the  relatively  few  votes  needed  to  secure 
election,  and  the  disparity  of  views  and  aspirations  among  elected 
representatives in parliament, render the system of government formation an 
unwieldy  and  unstable  process  producing  a  succession  of  inexperienced 
coalitions.    It  is  commonplace  for  candidates  to  be  elected  only  once 
(Lipscomb  et  al.,  1998).    The  recognition  of  this  fact  also  lends  itself  to 
political  and  other  opportunism  on  the  part  of  the  individual  members  of 
parliament during their tenure.  Moreover, the very high turnover in members 
of parliament renders it difficult to form a government with service credentials 
and experience.   
 
The context of national politics in Papua New Guinea is, therefore, one of 
extreme instability, shifting alliances, and frequent coalitional changes.  In 
2004, the PNG Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Rabbie Namaliu, warned of 
political  instability  because  of  changing  governments  being  "as  great  a 
liability (to PNG) as crime" (PNG Post-Courier, p.2, 18 June 2004).  PNG 
political parties have, since independence, always been forced into coalition 
because no individual party is strong enough to govern in its own right.  The 
parties tend to be differentiated as a result of their regional bases and there is a 
proliferation of independent members of parliament.  Such party discipline as 
actually exists is so lax as to witness party members voting as independents - 
or as it suits them or ‘their bank balances’ (ibid.).  Partly because of this 
situation and the fluidity of allegiances, there has been no sitting parliament  
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with  the  moral  or  political  courage  to  tackle  these  deficiencies  –  despite 
considerable levels of criticism of the situation both domestically and from the 
international community.   
This  situation  has  also  tended  to  render  obsolete  or,  more  damagingly, 
pointless,  any  attempt  to  effect  cost-benefit  analyses  based  on  the  Pareto
3 
criteria in the context of natural resource exploitation proposals in Papua New 
Guinea  (Kelso,  1984).    There  is  no  evidence  which  has  been  available  to 
demonstrate  either  criterion  in  as  much  as,  while  the  conduct  of  resource 
exploitation  has  undoubtedly  significantly  benefitted  the  principals  in  each 
instance; on the basis of the evidence presented in Chapter 4, there is also no 
doubt that a significant number of PNG inhabitants are and will be worse off 
as a result of the conduct of such exploitation. 
 
The difficulties experienced in resource exploitation management in PNG are 
partly as a result of the transitional nature of its society and the continuing 
reliance on the family and tribal structures.  Riggs (1964) describes this stage 
of societal development as the prismatic phase and the extent of this stage is 
not finite.   
 
The assertion which he makes regarding his observations of the fundamental 
impact which the family may have on such matters and entities as political 
parties,  public  sector  recruitment,  and  allocation  of  market  opportunities 
                                                 
3  The so-called Pareto efficiency curve (after Vilfredo Pareto, 1848 - 1923) indicates 
points on a locus curve at which one aspect of production or process may be given 
up in order to get more benefit from another.  
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appears to hold particular relevance in the case of Papua New Guinea.  The 
examination  of  PNG's  politics  and  administration  cannot  consequently  be 
conducted without reference to this context and to that of tribal loyalties. 
This prevalence of shifting loyalties and allegiances in the political system is 
not unrelated to the fluctuating nature of clan alliances which were common in 
the  traditions  of  the  peoples  of  PNG.    Moreover,  the  obvious  difficulties 
experienced by governments, lawmakers, police, administrators, or, indeed, 
anyone supportive or desirous of a system of democratic administration or 
government in PNG, are greatly exacerbated by the nature of what is referred 
to as the ‘Wantok System’.  As previously stated, PNG has over 850 distinct 
languages  and  those  who  speak  the  same  language  are  known  as  wantoks 
(one-talk, in Pidgin English).    
 
Dorney (1999) saw the proliferation of so many languages as being the most 
vital ingredient for any real understanding of PNG.   He explained that the 
chain of loyalty for the average Papua New Guinean is, in this order, to his 
parents, the clan, the village, the tribe, the district, the region, and loyalty to 
the concept of the nation-state of PNG comes last.  Dorney illustrated the 
general belief in PNG that the family and tribal groups, (the wantok group) 
come  first  and  this  contributed  to  political  instability  caused  by  shifting 
loyalties  in  Parliament;  corruption  and  the  diversion  of  public  money  to 
benefit  one's  wantoks;  poor  land  utilisation;  gang  crime;  and  a  generally 
ineffective public service.  
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As can be seen, under this system, which is a tradition deeply engrained in the 
community  and  prevalent  throughout  PNG;  wantoks  owe  each  other  their 
primary  loyalty.    It  is  a  system  in  which  the  concept  of  reciprocity  is 
paramount  and  taking  care  of  one’s  clanspeople  or  returning  favours  is 
prevalent throughout the clan society.  However, it contributes to - and, in 
some  instances,  constitutes  –  nepotism,  corruption,  and  neglect  of 
environmental, societal, or justice matters without which a democratic and 
even system of government cannot function. 
 
The corollary of this system was, of course, that those outside of a specific 
wontok were - and mostly still are – regarded as hostile neighbours or enemies 
and, as such, were regarded with a suspicion arising from self-preservation 
instincts.  This creates obvious difficulties in any attempt to establish a greater 
uniform concern for the protection of the environment or, indeed, any other 
joint effort. 
 
The  prevalence  of  the  wontok  system  contributes  to  the  difficulties  in 
establishing  a  sense  of  national  unity  among  Papua  New  Guineans  and, 
consequently, constitutes a hindrance to the economic and social development 
in the country.  The many ethnically disparate groups within the country have 
no tradition or sense of working together or helping each other and wantokism 
lends itself to a revival in neo-colonialism.  It was the view of Professor Allan 
Patience that PNG remained a nation waiting to be built (Patience, 2005 c). 
  
 
 
 
- 44 - 
The wantok system, in relation to matters of monitoring and policing within 
the  mining  industry,  also  exacerbates  the  difficulties  associated  with  the 
remoteness of the mining activities and associated access difficulties.  They 
are further complicated by the difficulties relating to a history of major and 
lesser violence in PNG both on the part of sections of the community and also 
on the part of the army and police.  In the late 1980s there were a number of 
occasions when members of the army and police took matters into their own 
hands and displayed their anger and frustration against the Government by 
attacking Parliament House and refusing to obey orders (Thompson & 
MacWilliam, 1992). 
 
2.4  Environmental Pollution as an Externality in PNG 
Since the publication in 1920 of Arthur Pigou's seminal work in the field, 
Economics of Welfare, there has been a greater appreciation and focus on the 
interconnectivity of economic activity and the impact of resulting pollution on 
the  environment.    Pigou's  analysis  established  a  distinction  between  the 
private costs of such economic activity and the full social costs of the activity 
on society as a whole.  He saw the full social costs as being the sum of the 
private costs and plus any external costs which are precipitated (Turner et al., 
1994).  
 
Pollution,  as  economically  defined,  is  seen  as  two-fold  in  its  effects;    the 
physical effect of the environmental damage and, secondly, the loss of welfare 
experienced  by  people  as  a  result  of  that  damage.    The  external  costs  as  
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defined  by  environmental  economists  encompass  the  costs  experienced  by 
people  other  than  those  whose  behaviour  has  actually  produced  the  costs 
(Field,  1997).  For  instance,  an  externality  involved  in  the  use  of  motor 
vehicles is the air pollution produced by such  use and the effect that that 
pollution has on those who might breathe the polluted air. Moreover, while the 
majority  of  environmental  problems  are  domestic  in  nature,  their  scope 
encompasses an international aspect which cannot be dealt with by a single 
national  government  especially  when  it  is  not  a  local  pollutant  (Dunn  & 
Ingram, 1996).   
 
A  negative  externality  exists  when  two  conditions  prevail.    These  are  (1) 
where the activity of one party causes to another party a loss of welfare, and 
(2) where no compensation is provided for that loss of welfare and, as stated 
by Pearce & Turner (1990), both conditions are essential for the existence of 
an externality.  Consequently, if there is compensation by the actor causing 
the  pollution  for  the  loss  of  welfare  caused,  then  that  externality  is 
internalised. 
 
In  the  case  of  PNG,  the  damage  caused  by  the  mining  activity  may  be 
chemical, such as damage done to flora, fauna, rivers and land by toxic waste 
contamination; or biological, as experienced in ill-health or species change.  
When these effects are experienced in locations extraneous to the polluting 
activity, they are deemed to be externalities.  
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It has become common practice for many multinational companies to relocate 
operations  to  states  or  territories  in  which  the  environmental  controls  are 
perceived to be more liberal than in the home country or in the existing host 
country (Dunn & Ingram, 1996). The question of responsibility for damage to 
the environment which is caused as a flow-on effect of industrial or resource 
exploitation  activities  and  the  determination  as  to  the  party  or  parties 
responsible for remedying that damage are matters which have presented and 
will continue to present major difficulties.  In the case of the negotiations for 
the passage of the agreement relating to the North American Free Trade Area, 
a lobbying campaign succeeded in introducing specific stipulations regarding 
the dumping by Mexico of chemicals into the Rio Grande as such activity 
causes harm to Americans on the other side of the river (ibid.). 
 
Specific interest groups, such as companies exploiting the natural resource, 
will not usually regard environmental quality as an objective of their activities 
unless they are compelled to do so which mitigates in favour of governmental 
intervention (Thampapillai, 2002).  Tietenberg (2003) describes the concept of 
externalities as covering many sources of market failure and examination of 
negative  externalities  and  damage  to  environmental  quality  caused  by 
economic activity also raises the question of market failure where the market 
system fails to arrest such damage caused by development.  The matter of 
whether  it  is  appropriate  in  such  instances  for  government  intervention  in 
order to conserve a natural resource is one which is argued extensively and, 
even with governmental intervention, political and administrative failure can  
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not  only  fail  to  alleviate  the  environmental  damage  but  may,  in  fact, 
exacerbate the problem (Tisdell, 1993). 
 
The relationship between the environment and the profit-orientated company 
is one which is, at once, dynamic and complex (Dunning, 1993).  Specific 
societal costs and negative externalities, are matters which, in most instances, 
necessitate  government  imposed  regulations  to  ensure  that  the  resource 
exploiter  assumes  the  responsibility  for  these  indirect  eventualities.  
Appleyard  &  Field  (1998)  have  suggested  that  negative  environmental 
externalities are reduced as a result of the imposition of implied expectations 
of  responsibility  which  supports  the  argument  for  extension  of  such 
regulations imposition. 
 
The  relationship  between  industrial  activity  and  the  responsibility  for  the 
protection  of  the  environment  attains  a  higher  level  of  intensity  when  the 
company is involved in mineral or natural resource exploitation.  It is further 
accentuated  when  the  effect  on  the  environment  is  a  result  of  negative 
interference, and the profitability of the operator is directly impacted by the 
level of attention and care with which it chooses - or is required - to address 
the question of the environment and environment remediation.  Examples of 
this  function  are  addressed  in  Chapter  4.    The  added  implications  of 
uncertainty  regarding  the  additional  investment  required  to  address 
environmental remediation matters raises the company's concerns even further 
(Harberger & Jenkins, 2002).    
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As a result, the extent to which a company might regard matters of negative 
environmental impact as a direct responsibility and, therefore, as a cost; or 
view  them  as  a  literal  externality  having  no  direct  implications  for  the 
company, becomes a matter fraught with questions of corporate morality as 
opposed to profit-motivated expedience.  The company must then determine 
whether  its  approach  to  the  environmental  issues  will  be  based  purely  on 
economic issues or involve a degree of moral assessment.  Field (1997) states 
that, viewed from the point of view of the moral approach, degradation of the 
environment is a result of unethical or immoral human behaviour.   
 
The complexity of this problem is exacerbated in countries such as Papua 
New Guinea where the country's economy is heavily dependent on resource 
exploitation.    It  is  clear  that,  without  balancing  assistance,  the  greater  the 
insistence  on  environmental  protection  the  less  attractive  a  resource 
exploitation opportunity becomes.  That resource exploitation and minimal 
environmental attention occur most commonly in developing countries is not 
coincidental.  On a microeconomic level in PNG, the benefits which flow to 
the  local  population  from  the  exploitation  of  the  natural  resource  are 
commonly  confined  to  the  local  traditional  landowners  while  the  negative 
externalities are visited upon a greater population with no claim to the benefits 
arising therefrom (Ballard, 1981). 
  
 
 
 
- 49 - 
The  causes  which  precipitate  environmental  problems  in  the  world  are 
identified by Princen & Finger (1994) as being due to unsatisfied needs of a 
social and political nature and, in particular, the needs of the world's poor.  
Attempts to satisfy these needs in the late eighteenth century spawned the 
industrial revolution.  The subsequent spread of industrialisation witnessed the 
proliferation of manufacturing facilities and natural resource exploitation and 
the  attendant  polluting  emissions  and  environmental  damage  (Pearson  & 
Payaslian, 1999). 
 
The conflict involved in such attempts to satisfy these needs is now nowhere 
more  evident  than  in  instances  where  the  land  of  indigenous  peoples  in 
developing countries is the subject of resource exploitation.  The dilemma is 
also  typified  by  the  allegations  of  developing  countries  that  rising 
international environmental standards are creating an unfair obstacle to their 
economic  development  and  that  the  environmental  question  and  recently-
introduced  environmental  standards  did  not  exist  during  the  time  the 
developed  countries  experienced  the  benefits  of  unfettered  industrialisation 
(ibid.). 
 
Despite the frequency of such conflicts between the interests of the indigenous 
peoples and the aims of the resource exploiting companies (Connell & Howitt, 
1991), mining activities continue to rank highly in the considerations of the 
governments of these nations, as is the case with PNG.  Such activities are 
frequently seen by these governments as the means by which the same degree  
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of  industrial  and  technological  advancement  as  enjoyed  by  the  developed 
countries  might  be  achieved  for  their  own  people.    It  has  become 
commonplace  for  decisions  made  by  the  government  of  PNG  relating  to 
resource exploitation to result in uncompensated negative externalities and the 
proliferation of such instances have precipitated a heightened awareness of the 
necessity  to  ensure  that  occurrences  of  negative  externalities  are  properly 
addressed.  
 
It  is  becoming  progressively  more  difficult  for  companies  to  avoid 
responsibility for damage to the environment - directly caused or indirectly 
precipitated by their actions.  When referring to the production of electricity 
from various sources such as coal, oil, gas, or nuclear power, it has become 
common to utilise the 'externality addition approach' or the full cost approach 
where the costs - both the private cost and external cost - of the supply are 
estimated and priced in order to reflect and compensate for related damage to 
the environment.  This exercise can have the effect of providing either a cost 
or  a  benefit  (surcharge  or  credit)  to  be  attached  to  the  charge  per  unit  in 
accordance  with  the  relative  impact  on  the  environment.    This  externality 
addition approach is likened to the 'polluter pays principle', endorsed by the 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1975, 
whereby the entity which precipitates the environmental damage is required to 
pay  the  costs  of  avoiding  that  damage  or  containing  the  damage  within 
acceptable limits (Pearce, 1993;  Folmer & Gabel, 2000). 
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This  discussion  is  conducted  in  the  context  of  the  realisation  that  popular 
demand for the elimination of pollution is not considered to be an economic 
practicality.    Pearce  &  Turner  (1990),  point  out  that  the  laws  of 
thermodynamics  suggest  that  achieving  zero  pollution  would  require  the 
complete cessation of all economic activity and it is, therefore, illogical to 
suggest or demand such an outcome.    
 
The reality of this situation was recognised and acknowledged by the PNG 
government by the passage in 1978 of the Environmental Contaminants Act.  
This  Act  acknowledged  the  fact  of  environmental  pollution  as  a  result  of 
commercial activity and it provided for its management by allowing for the 
issue of licences for the pollution of water, air, and land.  It also instituted 
prohibitions  and  imposition  of  penalties  in  relation  to  breaches  of  the 
environmental  guidelines.    The  relative  success  or  lack  thereof  of  that 
programme is a central aspect of the examination herein and can be judged by 
the evidence presented in Chapter 4.  
 
This  pragmatic  approach  is  further  developed  by  Ascher  (1999)  with  the 
recommendation that governments take responsibility for not only ensuring 
that resource exploiters are held accountable for the indirect effects of their 
activities on the environment and society but that they (the governments) also 
introduce  a  reward  system  for  those  companies  which  provide  positive 
externalities.  What Ascher (1999) refers to as pollution charges reflects the 
polluter pays principle adopted by the OECD and he recommends that these  
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charges be - by compulsion if necessary - regarded by the resource exploiters 
as an intrinsic cost of the total operation.  Failing such a requirement, Ascher 
is of the view that the resource exploiter will succumb to the temptation of 
overexploitation  in  pursuit  of  additional  profits  despite  the  high  cost  in 
societal terms. 
 
2.5  Environmental Policy Design and Decision-making in PNG  
Roberts (2004) describes policy as a set of principles and intentions to guide 
decision making and facilitates the matter of decisions made by politicians to 
be  implemented  by  public  servants.    However,  the  difficulty  involved  in 
establishing such policy in newly independent and former colonial territories 
is circumscribed by the delicate question of legitimacy and the desire by the 
decision-makers to be seen to be masters of the new nation's destiny.  In PNG 
there is, moreover, the added difficulty of the extreme degree of social and 
political fragmentation involving thousands of traditional communities, only a 
handful of which are represented in the PNG parliament (Filer et al., 2000). 
 
Also in the case of PNG - as with many former colonial territories - the pre-
independence economy was heavily orientated towards export production and 
the infrastructure and economic services were organised accordingly.  As a 
result,  there  was  little  initial  opportunity  for  digressing  from  that  policy 
direction or the dependence on export revenues and externally imposed trade 
terms.    This  has  meant  the  emergence  of  what  was,  in  effect,  a  drive  to 
increase exports while continuing to be relatively dependent on foreign aid.   
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Such a situation is further exacerbated by the instability of a new state, the 
inevitable insecurity of new and inexperienced ministers and those responsible 
for the policy decision-making and implementation, and the common lack of 
election policies of the new incumbents (Ballard, 1981). 
 
In a relatively early stage of the growth of concern for the environment the 
then  Professor  of  Economics  at  the  University  of  Sussex,  Geoffrey  Heal, 
enquired as to whether a 'market mechanism' would, in fact, determine in a 
sensible manner the management of resources (Pearce & Rose, 1975, p. 118). 
 Among his concerns was the manner in which the non-renewable resource 
was managed in responding, not only to current markets, but also to future 
markets and to "risk markets".  In this he was referring to the context in which 
economic  decision-making  relating  to  future  events  involved  considerable 
political  risk  for  the  decision-makers.    As  we  have  discussed,  this  is 
particularly relevant in the case of a newly established state.  While Heal's 
emphasis  was  on  the  longevity  of  the  resource  in  the  context  of  the 
expectation of future prices, the allusion was also relevant from the viewpoint 
of  the  immediate  political  and  personal  repercussions  for  a  governmental 
decision-maker.    
 
Field  (1997)  also  emphasises  the  importance  of  effective  design  of  public 
policy  to  facilitate  efficient  environmental  protection  and  control.    In 
postulating  that  the  majority  of  public  policies  and  programmes  for 
environmental protection may in fact be badly designed, the consequence is  
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the waste of money and minimal or no benefit to the environment.  In other 
words,  the  total  costs  exceeding  the  total  benefits  of  such  public  policies 
making the net present value of benefits of such public policies negative.  He 
cites  the  frequency  with  which  policy  makers  and  administrators  pursue 
ineffective policies which have been declared by them to be effective and 
which merely results in further economic waste.  He, therefore, highlights the 
critical  importance  of  environmental  policy  design  for  effectiveness  and 
efficiency. 
 
The design of effective environmental policies is the product of the political 
process and provides consideration not only for the environment but for the 
people affected by the policy decisions.  That process involves the interaction 
of peoples and groups in contending for influence and control and it witnesses 
shifting  allegiances  in  instances  of  the  collision  or  divergence  of  interests 
(Field, 1997).  
 
However, the determination of such policies is, by definition, and to a greater 
or lesser extent, impacted and affected by public choice considerations and in 
any  analysis  of  environmental  policy  determination  the  impact  of  those 
various interest groups on the political choices made by governments is to be 
considered.  In the context of developing countries such as PNG, in order to 
reduce the conflict with environmental concerns, the high growth expectations 
must be balanced by least-cost environmental policies (da Motta, 2001). 
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Field  &  Field  (2002)  cite  the  premise  that  people  pollute  because  it  is 
perceived to be the cheapest way of solving the problem of disposal of waste 
products as the environment is regarded as a free good by them.  
  
This realisation applies equally to government and bureaucracies as it does to 
companies exploiting natural resources or otherwise precipitating damage to 
the environment.  The consideration of the political choices as influenced by 
organised interest groups or politicians, therefore, leads to the abandonment of 
the Pigovian concept of government as a benevolent dictator and recognition 
of  the  maximisation  of  self-interest  motivation  on  the  part  of  politicians, 
governments, and interest groups (McNutt, 1996).   
 
But  the  environment  is  not  a  free  good  but  a  composite  asset  providing 
various service flows. The long-term objective of development should be to 
minimise the undue depreciation and degradation of the environment.  While 
various methods and policy instruments have been recommended in an effort 
to arrive at a system of pollution control, the polluter will not comply with any 
such system unless an efficient monitoring and policing model is effected.  
This might be a system based on the polluter-pays principle or some other 
system of Pigovian tax incorporating compulsory compliance on the part of 
the polluter (Sathiendrakumar, 1995) although Sathiendrakumar is of the view 
that an optimal Pigovian tax is not capable of being calculated and advocates 
the use of tradeable pollution permits. 
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Sathiendrakumar  (1995)  recommends  the  introduction  of  a  system  of 
marketable pollution permits as a policy instrument to be used in the control 
of industrial air pollutants as such a system would, in his view, have benefits 
such as acceptability from the points of view of government and industry, 
cost-effectiveness in comparison with other policy instruments, flexibility in 
regard to changing conditions, and ease of administration. 
 
Interest  groups  as  an  influencing  factor  on  public  policy  raise  a  greater 
diversity of issues and articulation of needs than can be addressed by political 
parties (Wilson, 1990).  Yet the influence of a particular interest group may 
far  outweigh  that  of  other  interest  groups  and,  indeed,  individual  political 
parties, providing them with the ability to sway governmental attitudes.  This 
question of the relative power of the interest group impacts on its  ability to 
subvert the common good or to confound the opinion of the majority and 
thereby unduly influence the policy-making function of government (ibid.) 
 
The emphasis on such concerns is accentuated  by the - at least notional - 
claims  to  social  egalitarianism  on  the  part  of  governments  of  most  of  the 
developing countries (Livingstone, 1989).  Livingstone further argues (p.249) 
that, subject to the existence of a "sufficiently sophisticated" administrative 
facility capable of adequate monitoring of the environmental impact, foreign 
direct  investment  brings  more  benefits  to  the  host  country  than  it  brings 
disadvantages.  The qualification which he introduced regarding the level of 
sophistication, however, is precisely that which highlights the deficiencies in  
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the PNG administration of FDI in relation to the environment and the mining 
industry in Papua New Guinea.  
 
One of the ways in which an element of control may be effected over the 
operations of a foreign company by a host government is that of minority 
ownership.    Nevertheless,  while  this  is  a  process  utilised  by  the  PNG 
government and has been an integral part of its resources sector policy since 
independence, the ostensible purpose in this instance appears to be that of 
greater revenue retention from the investment operation rather than the control 
of the operation itself or the conduct of its environmental practices.  This 
would appear to be particularly so due to the administrative machine being - 
understandably  in  the  case  of  PNG  for  the  reasons  already  stated  -  less 
efficient  than  a  similar  administrative  function  in  a  developed  country.  In 
September 2002 departmental heads and provincial administrators were urged 
by their Public Services Minister, Dr. Puka Temu, to translate Government 
policies into plans with a view to actually achieving results and alleviating 
administrative difficulties experienced in PNG (Palme, 2002).  
 
The process of ensuring effective decision-making is precipitated on a full 
understanding of the possible and likely consequences of the decisions and the 
process of public sector analysis for environmental policy matters revolves 
around efficient cost-benefit analysis.  The principle applies equally in the 
public sector in determining effective public policy and in the private sector 
where the principal focus is on profitability levels  (Field & Field, 2002).  In  
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the instance of natural resource exploitation in PNG it is a function requiring 
mutually supportive activities and monitoring on the part of both sectors.  In 
determining policy for the coordination of the ongoing national development 
and, in particular, exploitation of the development of the resources sector, the 
policy-makers  in  PNG  are  required  to  balance  their  judgements  regarding 
choices  and  the  concomitant  trade-offs  (Temu,  1997).    It  is  a  necessary 
function  involving  compromise  but  it  is  generally  believed  possible  to 
establish reasonably efficient policies for the control of externalities (Baumol 
& Oates, 1975).  However, without the attendant facilities for monitoring and 
policing the adherence to the policy the exercise is rendered futile.   
 
The modern process of designing environmental policy is predicated on an 
assumption  of  the  ability  of  promoting  economic  development  while 
maintaining sustainability.  This concept, as outlined in the Brundtland Report 
(Brundtland Report, 1987) posits that the needs of the present can be satisfied 
without compromising the capacity of future generations to satisfy their own 
needs.    This  introduced  the  concept  of  care  for  future  generations  in  the 
handling  of  resources  today  from  the  perspective  of  developing  world 
problems  and  the  demands  of  the  modern  environment-orientated  lobby 
(Cahill,  2002).    While  Roberts  (2004,  p.74)  sees  the  underlying  principle 
espoused  in  the  Brundtland  Report  as  a  “statement  of  faith  rather  than  a 
statement of fact”, it nevertheless encapsulates a premise without which no 
substantive forward progress can be realistically projected.   
  
 
 
 
- 59 - 
In  Dwivedi  &  Vajpeyi  (1995),  the  Brundtland  Report  is  interpreted  as  a 
qualitative advancement to the point of conveying the vital links which exist 
between natural environmental condition and economic achievement and that 
the one could not be sustained without the other. 
 
However,  such  high-minded  concepts  and  aspirations  as  contained  in  the 
Brundtland Report assume an added and extremely complex dimension when 
applied  to  the  difficulties  faced  by  PNG  policy-makers  in  relation  to  the 
exploitation  of  the  country’s  natural  resources.    It  is  also  exacerbated  by 
factors common to many developing countries such as externally determined 
terms of trade, an established primary dependence on export earnings, and a 
dependence  on  foreign  aid  (Ballard,  1981).      In  such  circumstances,  the 
question of ‘sustainability’ must apply in the context of the collateral damage 
or  negative  externalities  rather  than  the  non-renewable  resource  which  is 
being exploited and there is a tendency for public opinion to acclimatise itself 
to dramatic environmental damage and associated difficulties so long as the 
consequences are sufficiently distant (Roberts, 2004). 
 
2.6     Conclusion 
 
When taken in the context of the mining industry in PNG, PNG policy-makers 
are  faced  with  a  multi-layered  dilemma.    Firstly,  the  (usually  foreign) 
company exploiting the resource is, in an abstract sense, removed from the 
consequences of its actions.  As a result, there  exists for it a tendency to  
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concentrate on the maximisation of the private profitability of its operations.  
Therefore the policy-makers must incorporate such regulatory impositions as 
will ensure – with proper policing – that the collateral impact of the operation 
on the environment is controlled and minimised. 
 
There  is  also  the  situation  of  the  local  landowners  who,  while  benefitting 
directly  and  immediately  from  the  company’s  operations  and  who,  as  a 
consequence, may be disinclined to canvass limitations to the operation so as 
to provide a greater degree of protection to the environment are also impacted 
negatively  by  the  deleterious  effects  of  those  operations.      Despite  these 
negative effects there is a tendency on the part of the local landowners to 
ignore these in order to receive the immediate cash or kind benefit which 
accrues to them as a result of their consenting to the operations. 
 
And, thirdly, the other party to suffer from negative externalities are those 
with no direct input as to the decisions made, who receive no direct benefit 
from the operation of the company’s activities and, yet, who experience the 
greatest  suffering  as  a  result  of  negative  externalities  precipitated  by  the 
resource exploitation.  
 
The development and design of environmental policy cannot address all the 
competing interests involved in the issue but it must endeavour to ensure that 
those policies which are determined have the attendant implementation 
measures for effective monitoring and control. 
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Chapter 3.   Review of the Literature 
3.1   Introduction 
Increasingly,  over  the  last  thirty  years,  there  has  been  a  growing  body  of 
literature from economists who have studied the changing face of Papua New 
Guinea and the impact which resource exploitation in general and mining in 
particular has had on the economy and environment of that country.   This 
chapter will examine that part of the literature which is deemed to be relevant 
to the study in hand, i.e. the examination of the motivational influences and 
context which might have precipitated the current environmental conditions as 
a  result  of  governmental  action  and  inaction.    The  principal  classification 
differentiation  will  be  as  between  contributions  to  environmental  damage 
analysis and the analysis as to policy failures. 
 
The  great  majority  of  the  analyses  prepared  in  regard  to  environmental 
damage experienced in Papua New Guinea has tended to focus on descriptive 
analysis of the effects of the mining industry and analysis of the fact of the 
degradation  which  has  resulted  from  such  activities  rather  than  the 
contributing policy factors which precipitated those effects.  Many of these 
analyses - particularly those emanating from non-government organisations 
such as the Mineral Policy Institute (MPI) and the Berne Declaration - employ 
a  judgemental  approach  to  a  description  of  the  subject  matter  with  an 
emphasis on engineering the cessation of such activities.   
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3.2   Ethics of Conservation 
As mentioned earlier in the case of the OK Tedi mine formerly operated by 
BHP Billiton; once BHP Billiton had disposed of its interest in the mine and 
control of the mining operations had been assumed by local interests, "the 
NGO and legal pressure on the mine  evaporated" (Callick, The Australian 
Financial Review, 2 February 2005, p.53).  In light of such 'evaporation', the 
motivation for the continuous vitriolic and highly critical legal and intellectual 
vilification of BHP Billiton for its conduct in the mining activities at Ok Tedi 
must be seen in retrospect as being questionable at best and may possibly have 
been no more than an exercise in politically correct cynicism.  It would appear 
that the import of Thompson & MacWilliam's (1992, p177) assertion that the 
"ethics  of  conservation  are  interdependent  with  the  reality  of  political 
economy" has been lost on these actors or its relevance is perceived only in 
the  context  of  international  corporate  activity.    Thompson  &  MacWilliam 
went  further  and  proclaimed  that  any  inference  suggesting  that  no 
environmental degradation would have eventuated without the interpolation of 
capitalist activity was, in fact, 'nonsense' and confirmed that the PNG people 
were, as is most of mankind, interested principally in immediate returns on 
their endeavours.  
 
However, a polemic based purely on the premise that the ultimate resolution 
to  further  environmental  degradation  is  the  complete  cessation  of  all 
development or resource exploitation activities, while possibly aesthetically 
attractive,  is  by  definition  both  unrealistic  and  counterproductive.    Such  
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approaches, moreover, tend to ignore or play down the undoubted benefits 
which  do  emanate  from  such  activities  to  the  local  inhabitants  while 
emphasising the environmental and social cost of the exercises as perceived 
by the proponents of the argument. 
 
While it is recognised that environmental economics as a specific discipline 
originated with general tendencies towards such judgemental approaches as to 
the morality of resource exploitation activities rather than objective analysis of 
‘what is’:  as has been argued by Chapman (2000, a), and supported by Pearce 
&  Turner  (1990),  the  study  moved  away  from  such  approaches  with  the 
application of the principles in Pigou’s Economics of Welfare.  The approach 
which Pigou advocated emphasised the definition of economics involved in 
exploiting environmental resources as objective and positive science.   
 
Thompson  &  MacWilliam  (1992)  examined  the  effects  and  impact  on  the 
environment  of  the  activities  of  CRA  Ltd.  and  BHP  Ltd.  in  the  mining 
activities on Bougainville Island and at Ok Tedi.  In regard to the Panguna 
mine they asserted that the degradation of the land contributed to the increased 
scarcity of the resource base, the precipitation of the revolutionary activity 
which  occurred  on  Bougainville  Island,  and  the  ultimate  closure  of  the 
Bougainville mine.  What Thompson & MacWilliam were not to know at the 
time was the continuing calamitous vortex into which Bougainville and its 
people were to become immersed over the next thirteen years.  In the general 
context of PNG, Thompson (1994) noted that despite its abundance of natural  
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resources and mineral revenues in the 90s, the country faced major challenges 
to its development and growth. 
 
Following the closure of the Panguna mine and the cessation of the savage 
civil  war  fought  against  the  PNG  government  during  the  1990s  which 
coincided with the closure; the man who created the secessionist Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army which fought that war, Francis Ona,  in 2004 proclaimed 
himself king of Bougainville and declared Bougainville to be an independent 
kingdom.    This  development  coincided  with  a  move,  which  had  been 
orchestrated by the United Nations and the Australian and PNG governments 
over  many  years,  to  establish  an  autonomous  and  democratically  elected 
government for Bougainville (McLeod, 2005). 
 
The  result  of  the  elections  held  in  June  2005  as  a  consequence  of  those 
international  efforts  to  establish  the  new  Bougainville  autonomous 
government was to see the election of a new President for the Island, the 
choosing  of  a  new  flag  and  anthem  for  the  Island,  and  the  prospect  of  a 
referendum to be held in 10 to 15 years on the question of whether the Island 
would totally secede from PNG and assume total independence (Jones, 2005). 
 
However,  in  midst  of  the  celebrations  held  on  the  occasion  of  the 
establishment  of  the  new  government  in  Bougainville,  the  newly  sworn-in 
President of the Island, Joseph Kabui, raised the prospect of early talks with 
the  PNG  Government  and  Bougainville  Copper  Limited,  the  owner  of  the  
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Panguna mine, with a view to a resumption of mining at the Panguna copper 
mine.  In other words, the prospect of reopening the mine which gave rise to 
civil strife lasting more than fifteen years and precipitating the loss of more 
than  10,000  lives  (Philemon,  2005)  and  the  prospect  of  the  revenues 
potentially realisable from the mine's renewed activities was prominent on the 
new President's agenda on the first day of autonomy for the region and was 
sufficient to subsume ethical considerations which might have occurred as a 
result of the horrors precipitated previously. 
 
Further weight was lent to the prospect of the mine being re-opened at the end 
of  July  2005  on  the  occasion  of  the  death  of  Francis  Ona  {from  malaria, 
typhoid, or foul play (Sydney Morning Herald,  Treasure Island,   July 30, 
2005)} when the chairman of the Bougainville mine, Peter Taylor, declared 
that company plans to divest itself of the mine might be revisited as a result of 
recent positive developments such as the elections held in June of that year 
(Freed, 2005).  
 
3.3  Nation-States and the Environment 
The fact of the establishment of a separate autonomous region raises again the 
question of the danger - or, at least, the propensity - of the relatively new 
nation-state of Papua New Guinea degenerating into a conglomeration of such 
autonomous regions based along tribal affiliations or resource wealth location. 
Howitt  et  al.  (1996)  referred  to  the  tensions  arising  between  indigenous 
peoples and the nation-state as a result of this question of resource sovereignty  
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to  the  point  whereby  claims  of  national  sovereignty  are  made,  and  based, 
solely on the very location of an identified natural resource.   
 
These claims are made in direct opposition to similar claims made by the 
nation-state itself as to its right to the enjoyment of the benefits expected to 
emanate from exploitation of the resources in question.  In this regard and 
notwithstanding the tortuous and tragic route involved in progressing toward 
its  current  political  position;  Bougainville  is  a  case  in  point  of  a  specific 
resource  location  ultimately  determining  the  claim  -  and  achievement  -  of 
autonomy for the region concerned. 
 
Such quests and such achievement of regional autonomy redefine the political, 
economic,  and  cultural  relationships  between  the  nation-state  and  its 
indigenous peoples.  Furthermore, because the indigenous or regional claims 
to the sovereignty over a particular resource predates, as a rule, the similar 
claims  of  the  nation-state  under  its  constitution  (Howitt  et  al.,  1996)  they 
carry, by definition, the potential for the ultimate collapse of the state which 
was constitutionally established to embody those same various regions within 
its borders. 
 
As explained by Thompson & MacWilliam (1992), despite the environmental 
damage and economic and social chaos caused as a result of the Panguna mine 
operation – unimaginable at the time of the granting of the licence to mine - 
its closure, in turn, caused a decline in the PNG Government’s tax base and  
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receipts  from  exports  and  was  instrumental  in  forcing  a  relaxation  of  the 
environmental standards required of later mining operations and, in particular, 
that  of  BHP’s  Ok  Tedi  operations.    Thompson  &  MacWilliam  predicted, 
specifically in relation to the Ok Tedi mine, that that relaxation would lead to 
further  siltation  and  pollution  of  the  Fly  River  and  its  tributaries  and 
precipitate further environmental devastation of  the Fly River basin.  This 
study and others attest to the prescience and accuracy of their prognosis.  
 
In their incisive analysis of the spiral of environmental degradation in PNG, 
Thompson  &  MacWilliam  perceived  the  PNG  government  and  its 
instrumentalities not as malevolent or manipulated agents from a motivational 
standpoint but rather that the cauldron in which the State instrumentalities 
make their determinations is one bereft of sufficient information on which to 
make these decisions and in which conflicting forces are constantly at play.  
Moreover, they viewed any such perceptions of malevolence or manipulation 
or attempts at such characterisation as being somewhat irrelevant.   
 
This determination was offered in the context of the environment being an 
element  of  human  action.    Moreover,  the  view  of  human  praxis  as  being 
opposed  to  the  environment  as  a  force  of  production  while  coincidentally 
recognising humanity's total dependence on the survival of the environment as 
a  healthy  interaction  between  matter  and  labour  was  elemental  in  their 
analysis.    They  regarded  the  then  relevant  literature  as  being  largely 
representative  of  a  moral  ethos  which  proscribed  the  possibility  of  an  
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alternative  environmental  ideology  pertaining  to  the  reality  of  different 
peoples  at  different  times  and  correctly  viewed  the  trappings  of  capitalist 
activities as being forever inimical to the land, its people, and their traditions.  
They recognised the uncertain and irreversible nature of the consequences of 
the  decision-making  process  in  a  context  of  the  inevitability  of  a  conflict 
between development and the environment. 
 
In  the  wide-ranging  analysis  of  Howitt  et  al.  (1996),  the  dangers  and 
implications  inherent  in  the  emergence  of  internal  resource-related  claims 
being made by indigenous peoples against the nation-states, including PNG, 
were seen as matters of crucial importance.  They point out that the resolution 
of such matters have increased in complexity by the fact of globalisation and 
the implications thereof and the intrusion and involvement into the indigenous 
and local politics by international bodies such as the United Nations and the 
International Labour Organisation.   
 
During parliamentary discussion on 8  June 2005, the possibility of that to 
which I have alluded earlier, i.e. the collapse of the nation-state and a return to 
a more tribally-orientated society for PNG, was raised by the PNG Opposition 
Leader,  Peter  O'Neill,  when  he  said  -  referring  to  the  Bougainville 
autonomous government celebrations - that there was a serious possibility of 
similar celebrations (of breakaway PNG provinces) in the near future.  It was 
a subject also addressed more fully by Windybank & Manning (2003).   
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Their  assertion  and  focus  emphasised  the  vulnerability  of  the  relatively 
embryonic PNG society.  They viewed the fact of 'nationhood and centralised 
government' having been imposed on PNG by external forces in response to a 
perception of a desire for nationhood as a potentially fatally-flawed ambition - 
particularly in light of an absence of a proper understanding or appreciation of 
the  difficulties  entailed  in  such  an  imposition  on  a  geographically,  and 
linguistically disparate tribal society.  It is relevant to note, in the context of 
the general acknowledgement of PNG's early independence being a critical 
mistake, that, following concerted overtures from the United Nations, it had 
been Michael Somare who had pressured the then Australian Prime Minister, 
Gough Whitlam, to bring forward the planned introduction of independence to 
PNG (Forbes, 2002). 
 
3.4  Incapacity and Accountability Evasion 
Windybank & Manning (2003, p6) were critical of the "bloated and inefficient 
public sector" in PNG which accounted for approximately half of the total 
formal workforce and the public payroll and constituted approximately 40% 
of  all  government  expenditure.    They  asserted,  however,  that,  of  the  total 
number of public servants employed by the State, 10% to 15% were "ghosts" 
moving from one department to another collecting multiple paychecks and 
costing the government approximately A$45 million per annum.  
 
The  criticisms  of  successive  PNG  governments  levelled  by  Windybank  & 
Manning  (2003)  extend  to  that  which  asserts  that  the  weakness  of  central  
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government in PNG is such that any possibility of attaining national cohesion 
is  threatened  and  the  escalating  crime,  civil  unrest,  and  social  breakdown 
reinforce a downward spiral which becomes a self-fulfilling continuum.  As 
with commentators such as Hughes, they were, moreover, highly critical of 
the  detached  approach  by  the  Australian  Government  and  AusAID  in  the 
manner  in  which  the  provision  of  financial  aid  to  successive  PNG 
governments since the establishment of PNG independence was undirected 
and effectively devoid of accountability in its administration.  This approach, 
in effect, rendered the likelihood of the existence or inducement of Ascher's 
(1999) 'accountability evasion' syndrome more endemic.   
 
To the extent that the detachment mentioned prevailed in a context of having 
the appearance of respecting the right of PNG to make its own determinations 
as to how the aid was administered was seen as a sop to those accustomed to 
levelling  accusations  of  condescension  or  neo-colonialism  at  the  slightest 
perception of interference or provision of political or economic advice to the 
aid recipients.  Windybank & Manning (2003) assert that the result of that 
detachment is the absence of meaningful long-term development within PNG 
and the potential continuation of corruption and impoverishment within PNG 
leading, in the worst case scenario, to anarchy. 
 
The  continued  occurrences  of  what  Windybank  &  Manning  regarded  as 
attributes of a failed state dictated in their view the necessity for Australia to 
re-examine its relationship with PNG and determine a new approach to its  
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commitment to PNG development.  Any such commitment they believed was 
required to be devoid of over-sensitivity to accusations of undue influence and 
pressure  but  should  be  unabashedly  orientated  toward  encouragement  of 
administrative, social, economic, and political change from within.    
 
Failure to do so would, they asserted, lead to continued and further profligacy 
on the part of the PNG public service and political system which had absorbed 
and continued to absorb the principal part of the financing available to the 
administration.    Most  of  that  financing  was  provided  from  borrowing 
following on from a series of budget deficits.  The mineral rents accrued by 
successive  PNG  governments  were  viewed  as  being  an  encouragement  to 
continued profligate tendencies in spending and borrowing patterns and those 
borrowings previously effected contributed to a public debt which had not 
only  become  unsustainable  but  had  been  either  spent  unwisely  or  had 
disappeared. 
 
Political  appointments  and  public  sector  jobs  were  seen  by  Windybank  & 
Manning (2003) as constituting a major part of the overall PNG economy.  
These appointments and jobs, they stated, are funded by mineral revenues and 
international aid.  The monies received in this manner provided the basis by 
which the government grows the bureaucracy.  The appointments within and 
to the bureaucracy are keenly contested to the point where they allege that the 
appointment process has become a principal way of accessing state finances.    
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The manner in which such appointments are determined is also a frequent 
basis of acrimony within the state and the PNG parliament.  Accusations of 
corruption, nepotism, and cronyism are often levelled at those in positions of 
influence regarding such appointments. Prime Minister Somare is principal 
among those accused of such interference and the appointment of members of 
his  family  to  positions  which  are  under  the  aegis  of  the  government  has 
caused heated debate in parliament (PNG Post-Courier, 9 June 2005). 
 
Sir  Michael  Somare  has  also  strenuously  expressed  the  view  that  local 
journalists were betraying their country and that, having previously supported 
press  freedom  in  the  1990s,  he  now  supported  the  concept  of  media 
censorship and legislation to impose limitations on the freedom of the media.  
The catalyst for this declaration was the release of news reports on corruption 
and the finding by NGO, Transparency International, that PNG was the 15th 
most corrupt country in the world ('The West Australian', November 13, 2003) 
and that organisation, in December 2004, assessed that Papua New Guinea 
was losing between K500 million and K1 billion per annum as a result of 
corruption (Lasibori, 2004). 
 
Windybank & Manning (2003) viewed the political culture of the 'big man' 
syndrome, the attendant tradition of gift-giving, the custom of local patronage 
elevated  to  a  national  scale,  and  the  consequent  tendency  toward 
administrative bias and corruption, as the biggest challenge to constructive 
and meaningful change in PNG.  In the context of the recent social, cultural,  
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political,  and  law  and  order  disasters  in  the  nearby  Solomon  Islands  the 
concerns  raised  represent  a  clear  and  real  danger  requiring  immediate 
attention. 
 
The  frequent  occurrence  of,  and  the  growing  trend  toward,  the  PNG 
Government assuming equity ownership positions in new or existing resource 
exploitation  situations  constitutes  usurpation  of  local  indigenous  rights  to 
resource wealth in a similar manner to that effected by corporate entities - 
albeit, in this instance, it takes the guise of an action of a national government 
purportedly acting in the interests of all its citizens.  Indeed, the efforts of the 
PNG  government  to  reassert  national  priorities  in  resource  development 
projects (Howitt et al., 1996) further illustrates remaining partisan approach to 
ownership of resource wealth within the various regions and the difficulties 
encountered in establishing a sense of common ownership.  
 
While in a general sense, development of natural resources is considered a 
desirable pursuit on the part of national governments in the interests of their 
people, the determination of what a national government deems to be in the 
national interest does not necessarily have any connection with the interests of 
local indigenous groups.  Moreover, not only is there no assurance that these 
determinations  of  a  national  government  will  be  conducted  in  a  manner 
devoid  of  self-interest  or  corruption;  there  is  also  the  commonplace 
occurrence  of  government-imposed  sanctions  in  such  instances  which  
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negatively  and  permanently  impact  on  local  tribes  and  traditional  owners 
(Howitt et al., 1996). 
 
Pitts  (2002)  found  that  years  of  incompetence,  greed,  and  corruption  had 
precipitated  a  maelstrom  for  the  economy  of  Papua  New  Guinea  and  she 
compared the basic wage in PNG as determined by the PNG Minimum Wages 
Board as being approximately 2% of that of the PNG Prime Minister.   
 
Prime Minister Somare, meanwhile, in an address at the opening of the PNG 
National  Fraud  and  Anti-Corruption  Squad  office  in  Konedobu  in  2004, 
further  emphasised  the  growing  demand  for  reform  necessary  in  order  to 
combat corruption.  He stated that misappropriation and the fraudulent use of 
public funds by those in positions of trust was still rampant and continued to 
go unpunished (Post-Courier, 4 October 2004). 
 
The occurrence in PNG of transparent government which is capable of being 
trusted  with  responsibility  for  disciplined  and  responsible  discharge  of  the 
duties required of elected officials and appointed public servants is rare.  The 
conduct  of  projects  initiated  by  the  community  or  by  government  remain 
dependent on international donor aid.  The international donors themselves 
become  targeted  as  scapegoats  when  difficulties  in  administration  are 
encountered.  These entities include the Australian government, the World 
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.  This tendency has arisen and is 
accentuated as more demands are made by the donor institutions on PNG and  
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its government for more fiscal and governance discipline (Pitts, 2002).  Large 
sections of the capital, Port Moresby, continue to be controlled by 'raskol' 
gangs who rape, rob, and intimidate in face of  an ineffectual police force 
(Forbes, 2002) and the capital, Port Moresby, has one of the world's worst 
crime rates and unemployment rates (Pitts, 2002). 
 
It is argued (Pitts, 2002) that an increasing number of Papua New Guineans 
believe that they achieved independence prematurely; that remaining as a self-
governing  territory  under  administration  from  Australia  until  a  greater 
appreciation of democracy and open and transparent governance had become 
inculcated into the administrative and political system and psyche would have 
better served the people and the country.   
 
The reality was rather the devolution of administrative and legal authority on a 
non-representative  minority  of  expatriates  and  Papua  New  Guineans  who 
were expected to forge a nation from a furnace of ineffectual administrative 
systems, national laws in conflict with customary and local laws, a growing 
lawlessness and disregard for those laws - both local and national - and a 
diverse and disparate range of cultures and languages. 
 
Pitts  (2002)  cites  a  plethora  of  instances  of  corruption  and  administrative 
failures which continue to plague the country.  These instances abound in a 
context  of  growing  unemployment,  diminishing  educational  opportunities, 
ongoing failures in crime containment efforts, interference and incapacity on  
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the part of inefficient and corrupt administrations, and continuing failures and 
insolvencies of government organisations and entities slated for privatisation.  
She bemoans the fact that the citizens of Papua New Guinea do not enjoy 
transparent  and  trustworthy  leadership  which  ensures  the  prosecution  of 
fraudulent  conduct  in  government  and  administration.    In  her  analysis  the 
economy  and  government  and  community  initiatives  for  development 
continue to be donor dependent and attempts to prosecute those responsible 
for escalating corruption within government circles meet with failure. 
 
The failure to do so is often because of the practice of accountability evasion.  
This  occurs  in  instances  where  government  officials  distribute  economic 
benefits  with  low-visibility  mechanisms  thereby  making  it  difficult  or 
impossible to properly attribute the responsibility for the decision in question. 
 When  the  practice  of  accountability  evasion  on  the  part  of  the  officials 
involved is factored in, there at once appears, not only the initial inefficiency 
or deficiency precipitating environmental degradation; but, also, there then 
arises  the  difficulty  of  sheeting  home  responsibility  which  renders  the 
possibility of repetition of the inefficiencies not only possible but even more 
likely.  This practice occurs both in situations of exploitation by state agencies 
and  by  private  enterprise  and  the  combination,  in  many  instances,  can  be 
perpetuated  by  a  degree  of  autonomy,  enjoyed  by  the  agency,  which  is 
actually  heightened  by  the  very  lack  of  transparency  and  accountability 
mentioned. 
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Ascher (1999) emphasises the importance of natural resource exploitation in 
developing countries as the major opportunity for those countries to achieve 
higher levels of general prosperity for the country as a whole.  He describes 
the attitudes of the governments in such countries as cavalier in their approach 
to the development and extraction of natural resources.  Attitudes such as this 
are facilitated by accountability evasion by various means.  Ascher asserts 
that, apart from the intrinsic low transparency of natural resource extraction 
processes, governments will employ tactics such as the introduction of policy 
failure in order to further obfuscate responsibility and reduce accountability 
even more.  Many such resource policy failures are maintained and promoted 
by  officials  despite  continuing  evidence  of  the  consequences  of  unsound 
resource exploitation. 
 
In Larmour's (1997) analysis of corruption in the South Pacific region, he 
specifically  points  to  various  instances  of  'grand'  corruption  in  PNG  and 
ruminates  that  increased  evidence  of  corruption  may  mean  that  a  greater 
degree of corruption is occurring or that more corruption is being revealed and 
concludes that it is probably both.  He makes the point that politicians in PNG 
-  and  indeed  other  South  Pacific  nations  -accused  of  corruption  are 
accustomed to defending their actions by attributing a mantle of traditional 
acceptability on the conduct in question - such as gift-giving.  The ranks of 
such politicians alleged to have been involved in corruption and who have 
claimed their actions to be no more than traditional gift-giving are extensive 
and include several recent prime ministers of PNG.  
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Larmour, however, clearly established a distinction between a gift, which is a 
token  and  is  offered  gratuitously  and  publicly,  and  a  bribe,  which  is 
substantial,  demanded,  and  effected  in  secret.    In  the  context  of  'grand' 
corruption he referred to the Barnett Commission's finding of the frequency of 
politicians  actively  soliciting  contributions  for  their  parties  or  political 
activities from companies and noted the questionable ethical nature of PNG's 
Electoral Development Fund which provided direct patronage to members of 
parliament.  In this and in misuse of funds matters brought before the PNG 
Leadership Code Tribunal, Larmour found that such funds straddled a morally 
indeterminate line where public office was used for private gain and electoral 
advantage. 
 
That such a fund is extant in itself casts a shadow over the legitimacy of the 
election process but the fact that increases in these 'slush funds' should be the 
subject of parliamentary debate is a matter of concern in the context of free 
and  fair  elections.    A  recent  report  suggested  that  the  MPs'  electoral 
allowances - widely used during elections for purposes of bribery and political 
inducements  -  may  be  substantially  increased  before  the  2007  elections 
(Patience, 2004).  The situation was labelled by Patience as the prostitution of 
Papua New Guinean democracy. 
 
In 2002, AusAID provided A$10 million to PNG in an effort to ensure a free 
and fair election.  The fraud, death and bloodshed which in fact occurred  
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before and during the election made a mockery of the Australian aid (Forbes, 
2002).  In a review released in February 2003 AusAID itself proclaimed that 
the election support programme which it had funded had been largely a waste 
of taxpayers monies and recommended that the electoral aid be suspended 
('The West Australian, February 19, 2003). 
 
These  difficulties  are  exacerbated  by  an  apparently  irrational  and  erratic 
approach to the quest for, and receipt of, aid.  In August 2002, in his meeting 
with  the  Australian  Prime  Minister,  John  Howard,  -  aware  of  the  critical 
nature  of  ongoing  support  from  Australia  for  PNG's  economic  and  social 
future and in an effort to further expand Australian aid to PNG - Sir Michael 
Somare emphasised the bond with PNG's former colonial master.  Yet, little 
more than a year later, in October 2003 while hosting a dinner for the visiting 
Malaysian  Prime  Minister,  Mahathir  Mohamad,  Sir  Michael  saw  fit  to 
denounce  Australia  and  its  assistance  as  being  overly  encumbered  with 
conditions  and  blamed  Australia  for  PNG's  aid  dependency  ('The  West 
Australian', October 25, 2003). 
 
In the next chapter the nature and extent of the damage in the instances of the 
chosen mining operations will be discussed.  
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Chapter 4  Nature and Extent of Environmental Degradation  
 
 
Figure 4.1    Location of the Ok Tedi, Porgera, and Lihir mining activities 
 
4.1  Placer Dome’s Porgera Gold Mine 
The Porgera gold mine is located in Enga Province about 130 kilometres west 
of the town of Mount Hagen, in the midpoint of the Western, Southern and 
Eastern highlands of Papua New Guinea, and about 600 kilometres northwest 
of Port Moresby (Figure 4.1).  The mine is operated under the terms of the 
mining development contract (“MDC”) between the PNG Government and  
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the Porgera Joint Venturers.  The MDC specifies the annual rents to be paid 
for the mining lease and the compensation to be paid to local landowners for 
the “use” of their land (placerdome.com, 2003).  The special mining lease 
under  which  the  mine  operates  expires  in  2019  and  covers  approximately 
2,240 hectares and permits and leases have also been issued for purposes of 
campsites, airstrips, and waste dumps.  The Mine is operated under the PNG 
Mining  (Safety)  Act  of  1992  and  the  Mining  Regulations  of  the  Mining 
Inspectorate.   
 
The area surrounding the mine is extremely rugged and mountainous terrain 
which  experiences  a  high  level  of  rainfall  with  a  tendency  for  landslides. 
Because of such conditions and the consequent difficulties in constructing a 
dam  to  contain  the  tailings  (the  residue  after  completion  of  the  mine 
processing operation) to help control the effluent and residue of the mining 
operation, the Papua New Guinea Government approved riverine disposal as 
the most appropriate method for treated tailings and waste rock.  
 
The mine is operated and principally owned (50% ownership) by Placer Dome 
(which, in turn, is now owned by Barrick Gold Limited). Other joint venture 
interests include Goldfields Limited (25%), Orogen Minerals Limited (20%) - 
a  publicly-listed  company  floated  by  the  PNG  Government  in  1996  to 
privatise many of its resource assets (Anderson & Moramoro, 2002) - and the 
Enga Provincial government and landowners  through the medium of Mineral 
Resources Porgera Pty. Ltd. (10%). The mine employs approximately 2000  
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persons,  most  of  whom  are  PNG  nationals  (placerdome.com,  2003).  
Production began in September 1990 and, following a period of seven years of 
underground  mining,  an  open  pit  mining  operation  was  initiated  in  1997.  
Production in the year 2000 totalled over 900,000 ounces of gold and in 2001 
the mine produced 760,622 ounces of gold.  The Porgera gold mine is one of 
the largest in the world and is expected to produce 11.3 million ounces of gold 
over its 20 year life..    
 
However, in the short period of its operation, the level of pollution associated 
with the mine is arguably worse than that of the notorious Ok Tedi mine.  The 
level of toxic and hazardous waste discharged by the mine is far in excess of 
the levels permitted under Australian or PNG law. These discharges have been 
measured at levels considerably in excess of PNG limits (IIED & MPI).   In a 
2001  study  (CSIRO,  2001)  the  CSIRO  found  that  heavy  metal  enriched 
tailings are being deposited in the lower reaches of the Strickland River in far 
higher  concentrations  than  permitted  levels.    Silver  was  140  times  more 
enriched in tailings than in natural river sediments, arsenic 52 times more 
enriched and lead 45 times more enriched.  The MPI states that there are no 
legal constraints on the quantity of mercury that Porgera discharges into the 
Strickland  River,  despite  wide  recognition  that  this  is  one  of  the  most 
hazardous  heavy  metals.  As  a  result  of  the  discharge,  the  mercury  levels 
immediately below the minesite are so high that they would only normally be 
found below a mercury mine (MPI, 1995).   
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The mine and the PNG Government have agreed not to put limits on the levels 
of  mercury  contamination.    Mercury  levels  measured  at  Lake  Murray,  a 
distance of some 500 kms from the point of discharge, have become a stated 
concern of the Porgera Environmental Advisory Komiti (PEAK) (PEAK 1999 
Annual  Report).    PEAK  is  comprised  of  representatives  from  the  PNG 
Government, non-government organisations (“NGOs”) from PNG and abroad, 
Placer  PNG,  and  “independent  technical  experts"  (placerdome.com,  2003).   
Moreover,  the  PNG  Government  has  permitted the  first  140  kilometres  of 
river  below  the  mine  to  become  a  zone  with  no  limits  on  the  levels  of 
hazardous and potentially lethal heavy metals that may occur, i.e. the first 140 
kilometres of the Porgera River has no legal limit on water quality (IIED, 
2002). 
 
The effluent of the mine drains into the Maiapam River, a tributary of the 
Porgera River, which is itself a tributary of the Lagaip, which flows into the 
Strickland  River  and  then  into  the  Fly.    The  Lagaip  River  carries  a  high 
natural sediment load from erosion and land-slips due to the heavy rainfall in 
the area. Before the confluence with the Fly, the Strickland flows south for 
several hundred kilometres, passing to the east of Lake Murray (Figures 4.2 
and 4.3).  It then flows in to the Fly River, which continues into the Gulf of 
Papua.  The  Strickland  is  a  fast-flowing  river,  which  breaches  its  banks  at 
times of flood and flows into the wetlands and rivers in between its own path 
and Lake Murray.  The down-river communities affected by the operations of 
the Porgera mine total approximately 7,000 inhabitants (MPI 1995) and the  
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inter-connectivity  of  the  water  courses  further  exacerbates  the  riverine 
pollution which affects these inhabitants - further to which the Ok Tedi mine 
effluent is dumped into the Ok Tedi river which is also a tributary of the Fly 
river.   
 
Apart from the gold, the principal target of the Porgera mining operation; the 
ore mineralisation shows concentrations of lead, zinc, iron, and sulphur as 
well  as  traces  of  mercury,  cadmium,  arsenic  and  copper.    The  manner  in 
which the ore is treated produces an effluent consisting of flotation tailings, 
acids and cyanidation tailing, heavy metal sulphides and hydroxides, and very 
large  quantities  of  sediment.    The  amount  of  the  discharge  into  the  river 
system  totals  approximately  14  million  cubic  metres  annually  of  the 
combination of effluents and the levels of 'trace metals' such as silver, arsenic, 
and lead were found in a study by the CSIRO in May, 2001 to be 140 times, 
52  times,  and  45  times  respectively  more  enriched  than  in  natural  river 
sediments  (CSIRO,  2001,  p.13).    Given  that  the  PNG  Government  has 
sanctioned  the  140  kilometre  so-called  'sacrifice  zone'  downstream  of  the 
mine, it is permissible to discharge hazardous and potentially deadly heavy 
metals into the river system without being accountable for measurement or 
impact of these effluents.    
 
There is no limit on the levels of mercury which may be discharged to the 
river system, or found in the river system, as the Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) 
operating licence has not set any limit to the level of mercury permitted in the  
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river system.  The Placer Dome Inc. website states, inter alia, that the mine 
has at all times been in compliance with government approved waste disposal 
criteria.   
 
Following numerous complaints from local inhabitants and the publication in 
1995 of The Porgera Report by MPI, a Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial 
Research Organisation of Australia (“CSIRO”) study was undertaken to assess 
the Porgera mine’s impact on the downstream river system and local people.  
The study (CSIRO, 1996) concluded that the impact of Placer’s waste disposal 
on  the  river  was  significant  and  that  its  riverine  impact  management  and 
monitoring were inadequate.   
 
Nevertheless, Placer Dome states that the study found that the mine had no 
effect on the health of the local villagers but made certain recommendations, 
as a result of which Placer Dome established PEAK in 1996.   Placer stated 
that the primary function of PEAK is to enhance understanding and provide 
transparency  of  Porgera’s  environmental  (physical  and  social)  issues  with 
external stakeholders and to assist in reviewing its environmental performance 
and public accountability (placerdome.com, 2003).   
 
Notwithstanding these clearly stated objectives, the then Chairman of PEAK, 
Yati  Bun,  resigned  in  June  2001  accusing  Placer  Dome  of  using  him  in 
propaganda materials while doing nothing to mitigate the impacts of riverine 
disposal (Mining Watch Canada, Press Release, June 14, 2001).  Following  
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his resignation Placer Dome was dropped from the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index.   Chairman Bun's resignation came immediately following the second 
CSIRO report prepared in May, 2001 which found, contrary to Placer Dome's 
assertions,  that    significant  riverine  contamination  was  taking  place  in  the 
lower reaches of the Strickland River as stated above. 
 
The levels of pollution within the river system described above have been 
found by the MPI to be up to 3000 times greater than PNG’s water quality 
limits; the levels of lead pollution were more than 2300 times the Australian 
limits for lead (at Maiapam River one kilometre below the discharge point).  
At Wanikipe, 80 kilometres downstream of the discharge point, 32 times the 
Australian limits for lead were found; 10 times the limits for zinc and nine 
times the limits for mercury.  It claims that the levels of arsenic and lead 
levels are more than nine and three times greater than the PJV’s documented 
pre-mine  arsenic  and  lead  levels  at  SG3  (the  downstream  administratively 
established point on the river for such measurement) that the measurements 
for lead, arsenic and mercury at Nomad on the Lower Strickland River were 
three, four and four times the pre-mine level, respectively (MPI, 1995)  Not 
having had set any compliance criteria for mercury such levels were found to 
be 15 times the Australian limits and more than 15 times the recorded natural 
level at SG3.    
 
In June 1991 the Water Resources Board of PNG granted the PJV the permit 
pursuant to Section 40 of the Water Resources Act 1982 to dispose of tailings  
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into the Maiapam River, a tributary of the Porgera, Lagaip and Strickland 
Rivers. The Board specified that the discharge will occur at a rate of 39,830 
cubic  metres  per  day,  30  days  per  month,  12  months  of  the  year.    This 
amounts to an annual discharge volume of 14,338,800 cubic metres.  The 
permit states that on the basis of a treatment factor of K0.25 per tonne and a 
basic charge of K0.01 per tonne an annual charge of K35,847 is payable each 
year  (PNG  Government,  1991),  thus  the  volume  discharged  is  directly 
proportional to the revenue raised (ibid.).  That the PNG Government should 
require  a  royalty  of  such  meagre  proportions  per  tonne  of  waste  dumped, 
indicating  a  willingness  for  cash  as  a  further  trade-off  for  environmental 
damage, while granting a licence for riverine disposal does not augur well for 
a conscientious approach to the question of pollution monitoring and policing. 
   
As with mining operations in other regions of PNG, the degradation which is 
occurring  also  encompasses  a  high  degree  of  social  disintegration  on  a 
regional  and  tribal  level.    In  the  lead-up  to,  and  continuing  on  from,  the 
opening of the Porgera mine and the implementation of mining operations, 
there resulted a large-scale influx to the Porgera region from other regions of 
people with an extended and distant claim to ownership of the Porgera land.  
This occurred in anticipation of the benefits - particularly of a financial nature 
- which were expected to flow as a result of the mine operation.  In the event, 
over and above the wages paid for working in the mine, there was also a 
substantial level of compensation paid to the local inhabitants for loss of land, 
crops, and surrounding bush damage and for costs of relocation of families  
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and tribes.  The level of cash compensation was such that there ensued a rapid 
social  disintegration  process  which  introduced  new  inter-tribal  and  family 
tensions and socially destructive behaviour such as alcoholism and drug abuse 
became rife in the community (Glenn Banks in Howitt et al., 1996). 
 
4.2  BHP’s Ok Tedi Gold and Copper Mine 
The Star Mountains and Hindenburg Range, at an elevation in excess of 3,000 
metres, form part of the central spine of the island of New Guinea.  This 
central range, in the Western or Fly River Province, forms a major divide 
which separates the drainage of the Sepik River to the north and the Fly River 
system to the south.  The Fly River and its tributaries, the Strickland and the 
Ok Tedi, form a catchment area of approximately 100,000 square kilometres 
with the Fly extending some 1,100 kilometres.  The Fly River is the second 
largest river in PNG and has rainfall of up to 14 metres per annum and a 
discharge  of  approximately  200,000  million  tons  of  water  (c.  240  trillion 
litres) annually (rettet-die-elbe.de/oktedi: UNESCAP).   Along with such river 
systems as that of the Mississippi and the Amazon, the Fly River ranks as one 
of the largest in the world (Thompson, 1990).   
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Figure 4.2:  Mountain ranges and river systems 
 
In  the  upper  reaches  of  this  river  system,  there  is  an  area  where  the 
predominant environment is tropical to open forest and swamp forest, in the 
midst  of  which  flows  the  Ok  Tedi  river  (see  Figure  4.2)  and  in  which  is 
situated the Ok Tedi mine.  The Ok Tedi river joins the Fly river near Kiunga. 
From the elevation at the Ok Tedi mine of approximately 2,100 metres, it 
drops 1,524 m. to the town of Tabubil - a mere 16 kilometres away by air - 
and is only 34 metres above sea level at the confluence with the Fly river near 
Kiunga.  
 
While  the  mine  produces  both  copper  and  gold,  its  viability  was  largely 
predicated on the gold content of the ore body (Pintz, 1982). The deposit was 
discovered  in  1969  by  Kennecott  Pacific  Pty.  Ltd.  (a  subsidiary  of  the  
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Kennecott Copper Corporation of the U.S.A.) following their application for a 
prospecting authority the previous year (ibid.).  After a period of about 7 years 
exploring and assessing the potential of the mine, Kennecott abandoned the 
project  and  a  consortium  led  by  the  Australian  company,  Broken  Hill 
Proprietary  Limited  (BHP),  took  over.    To  develop  the  site,  the  town  of 
Tabubil  was  built  and  the  consortium  was  formalised  as  Ok  Tedi  Mining 
Limited (OTML) comprising of BHP (52 per cent), the PNG Government (30 
per cent), and Inmet Mining Corporation (18 per cent).  Construction of the 
mine commenced in 1981 on Mt. Fubilan and a 20 kilometre access road was 
built from Tabubil to the mine site and another from Tabubil to Kiunga (the 
port on the Fly River 800 kilometres upstream from the Gulf of Papua) to 
which is piped the slurry of ore concentrate, the product of the mine. 
 
The Ok Tedi mine, which is one of the largest open-cut mines in the world, 
started operations in 1984 and was lauded as a prospective major benefactor in 
the regional development of the area.  Pintz (1982, p.11,12) then saw it as "the 
only opportunity for large-scale industrial development in one of Papua New 
Guinea's least developed areas" and, significantly, he stated, inter alia, that 
"the  Ok  Tedi  experience  suggests  that  well-reasoned  policies  of  .... 
environmental  concern  can  be  integrated  into  new  project  design  without 
imposing arbitrary standards or prohibitive costs." 
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Figure 4.3   Map of the Fly River system.  Source: Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development, April 2002 No. 68a, Mining for the 
Future, Appendix H:  Ok Tedi Riverine Disposal Case Study.  
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It is now the single largest business contributor to the economy of both the 
Western Province and PNG (OTML).  In 2000, OTML's export sales were 
K1,025.6 million which represented 18 per cent of PNG's foreign exchange 
earnings.   In the 2001 year, its export sales reached K1,148.2 million again 
representing  18%  of  PNG's  total  exports  (Ok  Tedi  Mining  Limited).  
However, another product of that activity is the fact that approximately 80,000 
tonnes of waste rock and tailings are dumped into the Ok Tedi River every 
day and, in the period from 1984 to 1998, the annual average waste rock and 
tailings discharge into the fly River system was 65 million tonnes of which 
waste  rock  constituted  44  million  tonnes  and  tailings  21  million  tonnes  
(World Bank, Jan. 2000).   
 
It  should  be  borne  in  mind,  in  the  context    -  as  discussed  earlier  -  of 
environmental  control  in  Papua  New  Guinea,  that  the  concept  of 
environmental  management  and  protection  was  enshrined  in  PNG's 
Constitution and the fact of the passage of the Environmental Planning Act 
(EPA)  and  the  Environmental  Contaminants  Act  (ECA)  by  the  PNG 
parliament in 1978. Despite this, in the establishment of the Ok Tedi mine, the 
Government specifically exempted it from the conditions of both the EPA and 
the ECA.   
 
At the outset of the mine's operation, the environmental monitoring conditions 
and the conditions regarding the regulation of contaminant substances were 
severely limited by the fact that the intending Ok Tedi mine consortium was  
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required to expend no more than K150,000 in total (approximately US$50,000 
at October 2006 exchange rates) on environmental investigations rendering 
them  "totally  inadequate"  (UNESCAP,  1996).    Following  the  1980 
supplemental  agreement  (there  were  to  be  eight  further  supplemental 
agreements) to the initial 1976 Ok Tedi Mine agreement, OTML undertook a 
more  extensive  environmental  impact  study  which  recommended  a 
programme of future monitoring.   
 
The  mining  process  involved,  inter  alia,  significant  quantities  of  cyanide 
residue  which  OTML  argued  would  be  completely  oxidised,  i.e.  rendered 
harmless, by being passed over a 50 metre weir prior to impoundment in a 
tailings dam.  The tailings, constituting approximately 97% of the processed 
ore, were to be retained in a tailings dam to be maintained in perpetuity by the 
Company (clause 9.1 of the 1980 supplemental agreement).   Nevertheless, the 
Company initially strongly argued that the tailings should be dumped directly 
into the Ok Tedi river and that, because of the very high rainfall, any toxic 
materials would be diluted downstream.   
 
The Government, however, having witnessed the environmental damage done 
as  a  result  of  uncontrolled  dumping  at  Panguna  on  Bougainville,  was 
concerned at the prospect of similar uncontrolled dumping in the Ok Tedi 
(Thompson & MacWilliam, 1992).  The original 1976 agreement, therefore, 
envisaged that the tailings dam, to be built on the nearby Ok Ma river, would 
mitigate the environmental damage by allowing for the precipitation of the  
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waste within the dam and the passage of relatively clean water to continue 
into  the  river  system.    Construction  of  a  tailings  dam  began  in  1983  and 
OTML claimed that expenditure on the dam totalled $70 million (OTML).   
 
In the event, however, the initial tailings dam and waste dump were destroyed 
by  rainstorms  and  mudslides  in  December  1983  and  January  1984.    The 
Government, faced with the prospect of the closure of the mine by BHP if it 
insisted on the reconstruction of a tailings containment facility, submitted to 
the demands of the mine operators and gave approval to continue to dump 
directly into the river system (John Gordon in Banks & Ballard, 1997).   
 
That  decision,  although  beneficial  from  the  point  of  view  of  government 
revenues, resulted in devastating effects being visited on the environment and 
the  inhabitants  of  the  Ok  Tedi  and  Fly  river  systems  catchment  area.  
Thompson  (1990)  states  that  the  fact  of  the  Government  relaxation  of 
standards in regard to the disposal of waste from the Ok Tedi mine has led to 
siltation and pollution of the Fly River system and may extensively affect the 
marine environment as far south as the Great Barrier Reef.  
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Figure 4.4  Dieback of vegetation in the Ok Tedi River Catchment, 1996. Source: Mining, 
Minerals and Sustainable Development, April 2002 No. 68a, Mining for the Future, Appendix H:  Ok Tedi 
Riverine Disposal Case Study.  Photo credits:  S. Kirsch. 
 
Moreover, in June 1984, a barge transporting OTML chemicals overturned in 
the Fly River estuary with the loss of  2,700 60 litre drums of cyanide. It 
constituted at the time the single largest loss ever of one of the worlds most 
dangerous poisons. A further disaster occurred within a week when a by-pass 
valve was left open with the result that more than 1,000 cubic metres of highly 
concentrated cyanide waste was released into the Ok Tedi river [Hyndman, D, 
(1991),  Zipping  Down  the  Fly  on  the  Ok  Tedi  Project:  79,  taken  from 
Chapman, 2000, b]. 
 
Amidst continued and growing international criticism of the mining methods 
employed  and  the  environmental  devastation  being  caused  by  the  waste 
product being dumped by the mine, OTML produced a report in August 1999  
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entitled Mine Waste Management Project - Risk Assessment (MWMP) as a 
result of which a decision was made that BHP (later BHP Billiton) determined 
to  close  the  mine  down  in  order  to  avoid  a  continuation  of  the  damaging 
publicity and further litigation - the intensity of which was then increasing.  
Haraka Gaudi, of the PNG Institute of Public Administration, in a June 1999 
response to a query on levels of government controls in regard to, inter alia, 
waste  emissions  refers  to  the  decision  to  wind up  the  Ok  Tedi  operations 
within  fifteen  years  as  an  admission  of  the  magnitude  of  the  irreversible 
damage done to the OK Tedi River System.  He stated that what had been 
denied and viewed as a non issue to be swept under the carpet became a major 
environmental  issue.    This  announcement  came  about  as  a  result  of  an 
independent  study  conducted  by  a  group  of  international  scientists  who 
confirmed and verified that the problem of environmental degradation was 
much worse than admitted by OK Tedi Mining Ltd.  Vegetation die-back of 
the  river  system  down  stream  (Figure  4.4)  had  expanded  to  include  the 
forested  areas  and  OTML  had  finally  admitted  openly  that  it  could  not 
adequately address environmental issues, opting therefore for early closure of 
the giant copper mine  (Gaudi, 1999). 
 
However,  the  cash-strapped  then  government  of  Prime  Minister  Mekere 
Morauta, heavily dependent on the profit participation, royalties and taxes of 
approximately  $30  million  per  annum  which  it  received  from  the  mine, 
opposed  the  closure  to  the  point  where  it  agreed  to,  and  did,  introduce 
legislation which indemnified BHP against all future compensation claims.   
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The Government did, however, prior to that decision, request the World Bank 
to provide it with counsel regarding the report (MWMP) prepared by BHP.  
The World Bank responded  that, while the report provided as good as could 
reasonably  be  expected  advice  regarding  the  scientific,  engineering,  and 
financial  options;  that  the  social  aspects  of  the  situation  and  of  the 
recommended closure of the mine needed more investigation to bring that to 
the level of the environmental aspects of the report. 
 
In September 2001, BHP Billiton announced its intention to divest itself of its 
shareholding in the Ok Tedi mine in January 2002 and a further piece of 
legislation, the Ok Tedi Mine Continuation (Ninth Supplementary) Act, was 
presented  to  and  passed  by  the  PNG  Parliament.    The  mine  ownership 
structure  then  changed  with  the  transfer  of  BHP's  52%  equity  to  a  new 
company  representing  the  people  of  PNG  called  the  PNG  Sustainable 
Development  Program  Ltd.    The  new  company's  share  dividends  are  be 
distributed  to  the  people  of  Papua  New  Guinea,  generally  in  the  form  of 
sustainable  development  projects.  The  equity  transfer  became  effective  in 
February 2002 (PNG-online).  
 
Despite  the  rancour  and  furore  generated  by  the  environmental  damage 
wrought by the Ok Tedi mining activities, the mine is expected to continue 
operations in its new guise until 2012 (The Australian, 7 Dec. 2004).  The net 
cash flow to the company in the eighteen months to December 31, 2003 was 
$217 million and the mine was reported in 2004 to be contributing 15 per cent  
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of  PNG's  GDP  and  25%  of  its  export  earnings  (The  Australian  Financial 
Review 2 February 2005). 
 
In  his  2002  thesis,  Matthew  Chapman  discussed  the  activist  and  legal 
challenges to BHP and its Ok Tedi operations and discussed the Company's 
new focus on early  closure of the mine  and retirement from PNG mining 
activities.  This action angered Ok Tedi and Fly River landowners who were 
of the opinion that BHP should remain at Ok Tedi in order to rehabilitate the 
river and the eco-systems damaged by the pollution caused by the mining 
activities.   
 
One  of  the  principal  reasons  behind  BHP's  desire  to  exit  its  Ok  Tedi 
operations  was  its  hope  of  avoiding  further  liability  for  the  environmental 
damage caused.  Chapman discussed the possibility of BHP handing over their 
interest  in  the  mine  to  the  Government  in  return  for  absolution  from 
responsibility for the environmental liabilities of the Ok Tedi mine - and that, 
despite  the  vehement  objections  of  the  then  minister  for  mining,  Michael 
Somare, and the Prime Minister, Sir Mekere Morauta 
 
Chapman correctly predicted that the mine would continue operations until it 
was  no  longer  economically  feasible  despite  having,  at  that  time  (2002), 
dumped over a billion tonnes of mine waste at a continuing rate of 100 000 
tonnes of waste per day into the Ok Tedi and Fly River Systems (Chapman, 
2002, b).  
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Despite  this  ongoing  waste  dumping,  as  soon  as  BHP  had  disposed  of  its 
interest  in  the  mine  and  mining  operations  had  been  assumed  by  local 
interests,  "the  NGO  and  legal  pressure  on  the  mine  evaporated"  (Callick, 
2005). 
 
4.3   Lihir Gold Limited's Gold Mine 
Lihir Island,  which  is  15  km  long  by  10  km  wide,  is  in  the  New  Ireland 
province of Papua New Guinea about 700 km north east of Port Moresby.  
The island has several significant volcanic features, principal among which is 
the  extinct  Luise  Caldera  which  hosts  the  giant  Ladolam  gold  deposit 
consisting of an estimated 43 million ounces of gold.  The Lihir gold mine is 
located on Lihir Island and expects to access part of that extensive deposit. 
 
The Lihir gold project is estimated to produce a total of 13 million ounces 
over its expected 30 year life (Papua New Guinea Online - Profile).  Owned 
by Lihir Gold Limited, it is managed by Lihir Management Company Limited 
(LMC) which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Rio Tinto.   Rio Tinto (which 
had previously been forced to close down the Bougainville copper mine in 
1989), as well as having management control of the Lihir mine, also owned a 
16.3% stake in Lihir Gold as at February 2003.  As with the Porgera mine 
noted above, the PNG Government vehicle, Orogen Minerals Limited, also 
holds an interest – as does another Porgera participant, Placer Dome.  The 
Special Mining lease granted by the PNG Government in March 1995 is valid  
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for  the  term  of  the  company’s  Mining  Development  Contract  which  is 
expected to be for a period of 40 years. 
 
Consisting of one of the world's largest gold resources, the mine produces 
over 600,000 ounces of gold each year (Lihir Gold Ltd., 2003).   Its reserves 
have recently been lifted to 16.7 million ounces which would give the mine an 
active life, at present rate of production, of almost 70 years (Business Review 
Weekly, Feb. 6-12, 2003, p.32).  In 2000, Lihir treated 3.4 million tonnes of 
ore at an average grade of 6.01 grams of gold per tonne, producing 606,310 
ounces of gold at a cost of A$220/oz.  Following improvements in 1998 to 
processing techniques, the plant capacity had been increased from 2.9 million 
tonnes per annum to 3.6 million tonnes per annum (Lihir Gold Ltd.).  
 
The final planned dimensions of the pit are estimated by Lihir Gold Limited to 
be approximately 2 kilometres by 1.4 kilometres and is expected to have a 
final depth of 185 metres below sea level, and the mine production involves 
the stripping of between 36 and 42 million tonnes per annum of overburden. 
 
Most  of  the  ore  contains  refractory  sulphides  requiring  oxidation  before 
cyanide leaching and hydrothermal activity.  The high water table creates a 
major water problem.   The slurry is thickened prior to cyanide detoxification 
before it is discharged through a submerged tailings line.  Prior to the recent 
upgrading of its reserves, it was estimated by MPI that, at the then level of 
reserves, the mine was expected, by means of its ‘submarine’ tailings disposal,  
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to dump 89 million tonnes of cyanide-contaminated tailings and 330 million 
tonnes of waste rock into the ocean (refer Figure 4.5). 
 
The Company, in its ‘2002 Report to the Community’ (p.17), claims that it 
“continues  to  maintain  an  excellent  environmental  record”  and  states  that 
there  is  a  full-time  environmental  officer  from  the  PNG  Department  of 
Environment and Conservation based on Lihir whose “specific purpose” it is 
to ensure that the Company’s environmental obligations are met.  It further 
makes  the  claim  that  it  is  in  compliance  with  all  relevant  PNG  laws  and 
regulations, international treaties, including the London Convention.   
 
However, at the 24
th Meeting of the London Convention
4 held in November 
2002, Greenpeace International, in its submission on the Lihir gold mine and 
as a result of testing at its laboratories at the University of Exeter, alleged that 
the waste rock from the mine being dumped at sea contained elevated levels 
of toxic material such as copper, mercury, and metalloid arsenic.  In as much 
as the waste represented waste from industry, it claimed that the material was, 
in  fact,  industrial  waste  (Greenpeace  International  submission  to  the  24
th 
Meeting of the London Convention).   
 
Under Articles I and IV of the London Convention (1972), (the purpose of 
which is to prevent pollution of the sea by the dumping of waste or matter 
                                                 
4   London Convention 1972, Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972.  
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liable to be hazardous to human health or that of marine flora or fauna) to 
which  Papua  New  Guinea  is  a  signatory,  the  dumping  of  such  waste  is 
prohibited.  
 
Moreover, and as a matter divorced from the question of waste containing 
toxic material; the London Convention also proscribes dumping of industrial 
waste at sea and the dumping of inert, inorganic geological material which is 
described by the Convention as waste resulting from mining activities because 
of damage resulting from the smothering of marine organisms..   
 
The Waigani Convention of 18 September, 1995, of which PNG and Australia 
are parties, also confirms the commitment to prevention of marine pollution 
by the dumping of hazardous wastes. 
 
Nevertheless, the Lihir project dumps and is expected to continue to dump 
330  million  tonnes  of  solid  waste  in  the  Luise  Harbour  by  barge  and  89 
million tonnes of tailings contaminated by cyanide by means of submarine 
tailings disposal (Chatterton, 1996).  Submarine tailings disposal (STD) is a 
process whereby tailings are dumped at sea by means of a pipe from source, in 
the case of Lihir 125 metres under the sea.  Both types of waste, however, 
contain  heavy  metals  including  copper,  mercury,  cadmium,  lead  and 
chromium – all of which are toxic (Divecha, 2002). 
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Figure 4.5 Satellite view of mine waste at Lihir, revealing a plume of turbid water in Luise 
Harbour, caused by the mine. (Source: http://www.mpi.org.au/std/images/overview_med.jpg)  
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As a result of such dumping, at a rate of between 1,400 and 4,600 tons of rock 
per hour (Berne Declaration report, 1999), there exists  a visible ‘sediment 
plume’  in  the  Luise  Harbour  and  extending  out  to  sea  for  a  distance  of 
approximately 3 kilometres (Greenpeace report, 2002).  Lihir Gold Ltd. itself 
acknowledged, in its initial public offering document in October, 1997, that 
the  construction  and  operation  of  the  mine  would  result  in  sedimentation 
effects to the coral reefs along the island's east coast, and would reduce the 
proliferation and number of coral species and fish. The US Overseas Private 
Investment  Corporation  (OPIC),  which  is  prohibited  under  United  States 
legislation from providing support to any project considered, inter alia, to pose 
a major or unreasonable environmental hazard, refused to finance the mine 
because this offshore dumping violates international agreements such as the 
London  Dumping  Convention  and  the  South  Pacific  Convention.  (Berne 
Declaration report, 1999). 
 
The  population  of  Lihir  Island  is  approximately  7,585  (lihir 
.com.pg/community/comdev3.htm).  The  inhabitants  have  traditionally  been 
involved  in  subsistence  agriculture.    However,  in  1995,  after  years  of 
negotiations,  the  then  mining  consortium  and  the  Lihir  Landowner's 
Association concluded an agreement referred to as the  "integrated benefits 
package." One of the conditions of this agreement was that landowners would 
sign  a  contract  undertaking  not  to  bring  future  claims  against  the  mining 
company  (Berne  Declaration  report,  1999).  This  did  not  deter  angry 
landowners from the nearby village of Putpu from temporarily shutting down  
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the project's operations in July, 1988 due to concern about gas emissions and 
the general environmental impacts of the mine. 
 
4.4  Conclusion 
The first PNG open-pit mine commenced copper production at Panguna on 
the island of Bougainville in 1972 operated by Bougainville Copper Limited, 
a mining subsidiary of Rio Tinto (CRA).  The PNG Government was also part 
owner to the extent of 19%.  Environmental degradation on the island was 
identified  as  a  principal  reason  for  an  armed  rebellion  by  the  people  of 
Bougainville which resulted in the closure of the mine (Thompson, 1990). 
From  that  point  on,  PNG  was  destined  to  experience  a  dramatic  level  of 
environmental, societal, human, and economic devastation which still exists – 
albeit that that mine has been closed for over fifteen years.   
 
The mine was to become the biggest open-pit mine in the world.  As a result 
of  its  operation  there  was  precipitated  environmental  damage  on  an 
unprecedented scale.  This contributed to a full-scale armed rebellion which 
continued for over ten years, and a class-action suit filed in 2000 in the United 
States District Court in San Francisco against Rio Tinto PLC and Rio Tinto 
Limited by the villagers of Bougainville affected by the mine.   
 
Using a United States Federal law that allows such civil actions, the residents 
of Bougainville Island alleged that the Company operated the Bougainville 
copper  mine  which  resulted  in  international  environmental  violations  and  
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crimes  against  humanity  stemming  from  a  military  blockade  motivated  by 
civilian resistance to the mine.  Significantly, the claimants allege that the 
Company did so in collaboration with the PNG government.   
 
The suit also alleges that the local inhabitants continue to be exposed to toxins 
resulting from the Panguna mine and that they have suffered loss of property 
due  to  ongoing  environmental  contamination.  The  history  of  the  situation 
dates back to the time of the Australian administration of the territory when, 
for a period of four years leading up to 1972, land was leased on the island of 
Bougainville to Bougainville Copper Limited and many Bougainvilleans were 
forced to relocate or leave the island.  
 
The  claim  further  alleges  that,  at  Panguna,  the  Company  relocated  three 
principal  villages;  razed  other  entire  villages;  destroyed  the  rain  forest; 
removed a mountaintop in Crown Prince mountain range; excavated 300,000 
tons of ore and water every day during its operation between 1972 and 1988; 
laid the basis for environmental disaster by improperly dumping waste rock 
and tailings; emitted high levels of chemical and air pollutants; and turned the 
fertile Jaba and Kawerong river valleys into a wasteland. 
 
In the context of the Ok Tedi mine, the evidence of the dramatic devastation 
which  was  occurring  continued  to  attract  progressively  more  attention  and 
denunciation and, in May 1995, an action was initiated by the Melbourne firm 
of lawyers, Slater & Gordon, on behalf of 30,000 inhabitants of the Ok Tedi  
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and  Fly  river  basins.   They  lodged  a  writ  against  Broken  Hill  Proprietary 
Limited (BHP) demanding compensation for the environmental damage done 
by the discharge of up to 100,000 tonnes per day of untreated tailings from the 
Ok Tedi mine.  The quantum of compensation demanded was A$2 billion for 
damage caused by millions of tonnes of copper tailings which was claimed to 
have rendered the river ecologically dead and laid waste thousands of hectares 
of forests and flood-plains  
(http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/mm1295.04.html). 
 
While the hearings in Melbourne were in progress; primarily as a result of the 
action  and  with  the  intention  of  providing  estoppel
5  and  in  an  attempt  to 
obviate any further such actions, in 1995 the PNG Government drew up a bill 
entitled  the  Restated  Eight  Supplemental  Agreement.    The  bill,  inter  alia, 
allowed for compensation to be paid on an annual basis to the litigants by 
OTML but the legislation also sought to ensure that claims by its citizens for 
compensation against companies operating in Papua New Guinea be heard in 
the Papua New Guinea court system.   
 
The  Agreement  further  incorporated  an  unprecedented  combination  of 
provisions which, at once, purported to obviate the right of any future would-
be  litigants  from  initiating  any  further  legal  action  against  the  Company 
(OTML),  deny  the  natural  course  of  justice  by  eliminating  the  right  of 
                                                 
5   The legal doctrine of precluding contrary assertions by pertinent judicial 
determination.  
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individuals to give evidence in such matters, and undermine the validity of the 
country's  constitution  by  the  rejection  of  those  very  freedoms  which  the 
Constitution specifically provides. In 1996, it introduced further legislation in 
the form of the Compensation (Foreign Legal Proceedings) Act, 1995, which 
restricted  access  by  the  people  of  Papua  New  Guinea  to  courts  overseas  
(UNESCAP, 1996, c). 
 
These  attempts  must  be  viewed  in  the  context  of  the  fact  that  there  is 
enshrined within the Constitution of Papua New Guinea the concept of, not 
only  the  responsible  management  of  the  country’s  resources,  but  also  the 
requirement for protection of the environment.  Following on independence in 
1975, the passage of the EPA and the ECA in 1978 further reinforced the 
sanctity and requirement for protection of all aspects of the environment.  The 
fact of the passage of those Acts establishes the existence of an awareness at 
that time of the necessity to protect the environment and yet, in the face of that 
awareness  and  in  the  establishment  of  the  Ok  Tedi  mine,  that  mine's 
operations were specifically exempted from the conditions of both the EPA 
and the ECA.  This act defeated the very purpose of environmental control 
which was aimed at minimising the undue depreciation of the environmental 
asset.  The constitutionality of such acts on the part of the Government must, 
at best, be regarded as questionable. 
 
As an extension, the PNG Government determined to end further criticism of 
the Ok Tedi mine and evidenced hostility to continuing investigation of the  
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extent of the environmental devastation being wrought by the mine.  Similar 
to that which had earlier occurred in relation to the Bougainville copper mine, 
in 1992 an action was initiated against OTML by a local environmental group, 
the  Wau  Ecology  Institute,  at  the  (then)  European  Commission-funded 
International  Water  Tribunal  in  Amsterdam.    The  investigating  scientists 
commissioned by the Tribunal were refused visas by the PNG Government 
(Chapman, 2000, b). 
 
The exemption of the Ok Tedi mine operations, in and of itself, facilitated so 
much devastation to the environment in and around the Fly River system that 
it caused a quantum leap in the world awareness of the damage being effected 
on  the  environment in  PNG.   It  laid  open  to  extreme  criticism  successive 
governments  which  have  tolerated  or  sanctioned  the  mining  and  natural 
resource exploitation activities which are responsible for this devastation.   
 
The actions of the PNG Government in endeavouring to dampen any further 
criticism of the mining activities and its efforts to obstruct any investigation 
and litigation – either domestic or of foreign initiation – further exacerbated 
an already highly charged situation and made a resolution of the problems 
more difficult.  
 
The opprobrium in which the mining activities are now held is greater than 
ever, yet the structural priorities for the PNG economy are such as to render 
the  question  of  environmental  degradation  as  incapable  of  appropriate  
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remedial  action  without  further  and  substantial  international  aid  both  of 
financial and administrative nature.  The growing awareness of the problem - 
while  continuing  to  focus  international  attention,  does  not  alleviate  the 
problem. 
 
This research is not primarily focussed on the environmental degradation per 
se but rather the reasons as to why the PNG Government would have made the 
decisions which precipitated the damage.  Nevertheless, it is necessary that a 
scope of degradation be established in order to provide context to the analysis. 
 This chapter has briefly illustrated the extent of the damage caused. 
 
The possible reasons for the continuing propensity of the PNG government to 
not  only  permit  continuing  environmental  degradation  but  to  openly 
encourage  those  activities  which  precipitate  such  degradation  will  be 
examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5     Government Policy Failure and Corruption 
5.1  Government Policy Failure 
The  symptoms  of  the  inherent  and  endemic  weakness  of  the  PNG  state 
coincidentally  contribute  to  the  causal  tendencies  toward  incompetent  and 
disfunctional administrative conduct and precipitate a vicious cycle of crime 
and corruption.  They include frequent political changes in both leadership 
and  government  and  continuing  corruption  on  a  national  scale.    This 
precipitates  public  frustration  which  is,  in  turn,  frequently  manifested  in 
criminality and a continuing and growing disdain for the rule of law.  This 
disdain is evidenced by further violence and crime which is often countered 
by overreaction on the part of state agencies which are overwhelmed by their 
inability to control the situation.  Such overreaction merely serves to reinforce 
community  opposition  and  introspection  which  continues  the  cycle.    The 
populations  of  entire  villages  which  have  been  burned  down  and  whose 
livestock has been destroyed are not uncommonly and not surprisingly left 
frightened and destitute (Pitts, 2002). 
 
In effect, the concept of nationality and national spaces is one which has been 
largely imposed on the PNG indigenous peoples by the subsequent dominance 
of immigrant populations and the formation of states by colonial influences 
and  external  powers.    In  such  formations,  there  is  abundant  evidence  of 
arbitrary imposition of borders destined to become the defining boundaries of 
a new nation-state without proper - or any - consideration of the displacement 
effects on the local indigenous populations.     
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Problematic  examples  of  these  colonial  impositions  of  national  boundaries 
include instances such as the absorption of West Papua within the Indonesian 
nation state which was later to precipitate ongoing difficulties both internally 
and  internationally;  the  amalgamation  of  the  hundreds  of  disparate  tribes, 
islands, and allegiances to form Papua New Guinea;  and the imposition of the 
border between Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam where whole tribes continue to 
be forcibly relocated or extradited.  Bougainville has become  a prominent 
example  of  a  territory  enveloped  in  the  colonial  imposition  of  nation-
statehood which was later to collapse into protracted civil war as a direct 
result  of  the  implications  of  that  imposition.    The  ensuing  prospective 
resolution of that situation is now to be the effective secession of the territory 
from the nation-state of which it was an established part. 
 
The external imposition of enforced unity on what is clearly a conglomeration 
of disparate tribal and regional affiliations is exemplified in the political and 
regional construct of the state of Papua New Guinea itself.  The fact of these 
imposed boundaries contributes to the complications and dilemmas which the 
PNG  Government  faces  in  the  context  of  each natural  resource  licence  or 
franchise which it grants and also contributes to the degradation of the natural 
resources and the neglect of any remedial action on the part of the government 
in that context. 
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In most instances of natural resource degradation the responsibility can be 
traced directly to policy failure on the part of government and resulting from 
inept and incompetent decision-making (Ascher, 1999).   In the case of Papua 
New Guinea, there appears to be justification for believing that the damage 
done to the environment over an extended period and continuing in the face of 
damning evidence of that damage is indeed primarily a result of incompetence 
and incapacity on the part of the officials responsible for the administration of 
that function (ibid.).  The position is further considerably aggravated by the 
chaotic nature of parliamentary elections in PNG and corruption involving 
bribery and nepotism as was shown in Sections 2.3 and 3.4. 
 
Successive PNG governments permitted continuing devastation of the natural 
environment during the period of the operation of the Panguna mine on the 
island  of  Bougainville.    This  environmental  devastation  not  only  created 
widespread hardship for the inhabitants of Bougainville but also contributed to 
the civil war which raged for almost 15 years.  As a result, statutory measures 
were put in place in order to ensure that such environmental damage did not 
recur. 
 
However,  as  I  have  pointed  out  in  Chapter  4,  the  response  of  the  PNG 
Government  to  the  extraordinary  environmental degradation  resulting  from 
the  collapse  of  the  tailings  dam  at  the  Ok  Tedi  mine  site  December 
1983/January  1984  was  not  an  insistence  that  a  new  tailings  dam  be 
constructed and that the damage already caused should be remedied.  On the  
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contrary, the response of the government was that the statutory requirement 
for a tailings dam of any description be removed - a decision which gave the 
company effective sanction to continue dumping approximately 80,000 tonnes 
of waste rock and tailings directly into the river system on a daily basis from 
that time onwards. 
 
In  PNG  the  institutions  inherent  in  a  political  system  of  validation, 
maintenance, and restoration of order within a uniform framework of social 
relationships common in Western society are lacking.  PNG has no tradition 
of a hierarchy of specifically vested authorities for purposes of legislative, 
administrative, and judicial functions.  As discussed in Section 2.2, even now 
the primary focus of PNG society remains the clan and, to that extent, can be 
viewed as stateless and cannot be described as a single body politic, united 
and unique (also Berndt & Lawrence, 1971). 
 
Moreover, as has been shown in the case of PNG, the political context is such 
as to represent a breeding ground for corruption and cynical opportunism. The 
large number of candidates - sometimes as many as 30 times the available 
number of parliamentary seats - who regularly stand in general elections has 
the  effect  of  damagingly  splitting  the  vote  along  tribal  lines.    As  a  result 
corruption throughout the process of election has become endemic using the 
controversial Rural Development Funds or what are commonly referred to as 
slush funds (Pitts, 2002).   
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In an environment where it is commonplace for candidates to be elected to 
parliament  only  once  (Lipscomb  et  al.,  1998)  it  is  not  surprising  that 
individual members of parliament are often disposed toward promoting their 
personal  interests  during  their  tenure  -  frequently  to  the  detriment  of  the 
national and community interest.  The national political scene has proven to 
be  extremely  unstable  and  party  discipline  is  such  that  party  members 
frequently vote as independents or "to augment their bank balances" (PNG 
Post-Courier, p.2, 18 June 2004).   
 
The opportunities which were initially presented to the PNG Government to 
generate revenue flows from resource exploitation were to be constrained by a 
degree of care and protection for the environment which still existed in the 
initial  stages  of  the  country’s  newly  established  independence.    These 
constraints were predicated on the adoption of the country's constitution and 
the  environmentally-protective  measures  and  aspirations  enshrined  therein.  
There was also, during the discussions concerning the assumption of control 
of the Ok Tedi development by BHP, a growing concern for the environment 
as  a  result  of  studies  which  had  been  undertaken  in  the  lead-up  to  their 
involvement.    These  studies  were  undertaken  by  government  specifically 
because of the misgivings generated by previous experience - particularly in 
the Bougainville Panguna mine (Chapman, 2000, b). 
 
Moreover, there was a certain sensitivity among PNG politicians as a result of 
the environmental damage which had been experienced as a consequence of  
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the operation of the Panguna mine.  Conzinc Riotinto of Australia Limited - or 
CRA, as the company was known - had been granted a prospecting licence in 
relation to the Crown Prince Mountain Ranges on Bougainville Island and had 
determined that there existed 500 million tonnes of low grade copper ore with 
a significant gold content (ibid.).   
 
Following the initiation of production at the Panguna mine site in 1972 it 
rapidly became the largest mine in the Southern Hemisphere with direct and 
indirect  employment  for  in  excess  of  4,000  people.    But  by  the  time 
discussions  were  taking  place  between  the  PNG  government  and  BHP 
regarding  the  proposed  Ok  Tedi  mining  operations,  the  evidence  of  the 
environmental disaster on Bougainville as a result of the improper dumping of 
waste rock and tailings and the emission of chemical and air pollutants was 
beginning to be clearly evident.  The political fall-out from such devastation 
had significantly contributed to the passage in 1978 in the PNG Parliament of 
the  Environmental  Planning  Act  as  one  of  the  reactive  statutory  measures 
effected  –  effected,  that  is  to  say,  as  legislation  but  largely  ignored  in  its 
administration and policing. 
 
Because  of  these  concerns  and  the  lack  of  adequate  completed  fieldwork 
which  would  have  been  necessary  to  produce  a  satisfactory  environmental 
study  for  the  Ok  Tedi  proposal,  the  Government  undertook  its  own 
environmental  investigations  in  1979  (conducted  by  specialists  from  the 
Australian National University) which raised serious concerns regarding the  
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effects of mine waste on the river system and its inhabitants.  The study used 
the known effects of the Bougainville activities as a basis for modelling the 
likely impact of the intended mining operation at Ok Tedi.  The results of 
these  "government-sponsored  studies  raised  substantial  questions  about  the 
effects of mine waste dumping in the Ok Tedi River on down-stream residents 
and subsistence life-styles." (Pintz, 1984 p.80).  In fact, as has been shown, 
the  concerns  raised  by  the  studies  were  not  only  borne  out  following  the 
initiation of the Ok Tedi operation; the actual environmental damage was, and 
was acknowledged to be, considerably greater than anticipated.  
 
As  a  consequence  of  these  findings,  the  PNG  Cabinet  directed  that  high 
priority be accorded to the matter of mine-induced sediment control.  Despite 
the prior awareness of these potential concerns and its self-produced empirical 
data, the Government was eager to proceed with the mining activities and it 
proceeded  to  sanction,  not  only  the  early  stage  operations  after  the 
construction  of  the  tailings  dam  at  Ok  Tedi,  but  also  all  the  later  mining 
undertakings and their attendant and evident environmental devastation. 
 
As the development of these projects proceeded and they began to generate 
the expected revenues and as reliance on these revenues grew, the temptation 
to alleviate or dispense with the environmental protective conditions on such 
exploitation became overwhelming.  Pintz, writing in 1984 (as the Ok Tedi 
mine  was  under  development),  discussed  the  question  of  power  struggles 
between central and provincial government bureaucracies as a direct result of  
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resource development opportunities but was optimistic that control of field 
activities would be returned to central government and, thereby, provide a 
better basis for further natural resource project development for the future.  He 
was  of  the  opinion  that  the  question  of  environmental  concern  could  be 
assimilated  into  well-reasoned  policies  in  new  project  design  without  the 
imposition  of  improperly  addressed  environmental  protective  measures  or 
costs.   
 
His optimism, however, was misplaced.  This was evidenced later when a 
large number of the requirements originally stipulated by the government for 
environmental protection were summarily dispensed with when it was faced 
with the possibility of the loss of those revenues provided by the Ok Tedi 
mine.  It would appear to bear out Ascher's (1999) contention that improper 
resource exploitation is not only caused by government policy deficiencies, 
but that those very failures induce or even force such conduct.  In the case of 
Ok Tedi, the revenue created for the government by the mine was sufficient to 
precipitate a certain tolerance or a purposeful ignoring of the occurrences of 
grave environmental degradation.   
 
Why the PNG Government should have moved from an initial position of 
grave concern regarding the potential damage to the environment as a result of 
mining activities and the initiation of environmentally-protective policies to 
one which dispenses with any response other than lip service appears to be 
heavily interconnected with the question of revenue generation.  However, it  
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should  be  noted,  in  endeavouring  to  determine  the  reasons  for  such  an 
apparent growth in disinterest in the health of the environment in favour of 
immediate return (either in terms of generation of revenue to the government 
or advancement or benefits to individual government officials), that the focus 
is on the failure of government policy.   
 
In the case of the mining industry in PNG, it is also to be noted that, with or 
without  government  departmental  autonomy  and  lack  of  transparency,  the 
continuing failure to address the growing level of degradation appears to be 
evidence, on the part of the PNG Government and government officials, of a 
lack of interest in remedying the degradation caused by the industry or an 
inability to implement a remedial process.  This situation is aggravated – and 
its appearance becomes more pointed in the circumstances - where there is a 
legislative requirement on the part of the natural resource developer to forfeit 
a  percentage  of  the  gold  mined  as  well  as,  and  coincidentally  with,  the 
payment of taxation on the balance of its efforts.  The obvious inference is 
that this is a direct result of a royalty system which is devoid of the necessary 
monitoring and policing policies and governance. 
 
It is also frequently alleged that, to a large extent, the reason why natural 
resources are so badly managed in developing countries is because of the lack 
of knowledge and capacity to properly administer the resources on the part of 
the officials charged with their management.  Ascher (1999, p.28) rejects this 
argument  when  he  states  that  not  only  are  such  failings  inadequate  as  an  
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explanation  but,  further,  that  “ignorance  may  well  be  a  strategy  and  a 
deliberate  outcome  of  government  policy  designed  to  allow  certain 
government officials to evade criticism”.  Moreover, following public choice 
theorists’ assertions regarding vote maximisation, it can be argued that the 
decision-making process is, in fact, partly or wholly motivated by "a desire to 
gain political power" (McNutt, 1996, p.8) or the establishment of the means to 
such power. 
 
The  misallocation  or  misuse  of  environmental  resources  is  not  merely  a 
question of market failure; a range of government intervention policies and 
general  governmental  neglect  have  themselves  been  the  cause  of 
environmental damage (Pearse & Turner, 1990) and the question of how a 
country with such immense resource potential as PNG can have mismanaged 
that potential so badly, precipitated environmental degradation on such a vast 
scale,  and  provided  so  little  by  way  of return to  its  citizens  is  one  which 
remains a critical issue (Gomez, 2006).  
 
The  ultimate  responsibility  for  these  failures  rests  with  successive  PNG 
governments.  The Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2006) stated that PNG 
was a country with extensive potential for economic growth, yet the quality of 
its  governance  continued  to  constrain  its  investment  and  development 
opportunities and the standard of governance had been deteriorating gradually 
since the late 1980s. The results of this deterioration are evident in the decline 
in the ability to provide basic services, in serious law and order problems, and  
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in institutional weaknesses which allow corruption to thrive (ADB, 2006).  
 
The ADB describes PNG as a country with a fragile sense of nationhood.  
Because of the absence of this national conviction of unity there is a very real 
and present danger in that, unless that attitude is redressed, the likelihood of 
the country disintegrating into the situation of a failed state becomes greater.  
There have been several previous instances of partisan attempts for various 
provinces to secede from PNG.  The attempt by Francis Ona and the BRA in 
2004 to establish Bougainville as a separate nation/kingdom is one example. 
The  failure  of  that  attempt  at  the  time  does  not,  however,  obviate  the 
possibility of Bougainville yet seceding from PNG.    
 
There coincided with the efforts of Ona and the BRA at the time, an effort by 
the United Nations and the Australian and PNG governments to establish an 
autonomous  and  democratically  elected  government  for  Bougainville 
(McLeod, 2005).  The result of elections held subsequently as a consequence 
of those international efforts saw the election of a new president for the Island, 
the choosing of a new flag and anthem for the Island, and the prospect of a 
referendum to be held in 10 to 15 years on the question of whether the Island 
would totally secede from PNG and assume total independence (Jones, 2005).  
 
Such efforts and internationally supported elections can only encourage other 
groups to think in a similar fashion and to be seen to be encouraging further 
provincial attempts toward secession.  At the least, it could be seen to detract  
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from a universal commitment to a nation-building effort on the part of the 
government and people of PNG.  This general commitment to national unity 
on the part of the people of PNG is an essential requirement if the people are 
ever to jointly hold their government accountable for its actions and policy 
failures - including those affecting the environment.  Any such thinking on the 
part of the populace or provincial governments can only be detrimental to 
environmentally-protective efforts.  
 
In  May  2006,  following  the  failure  of  its  political,  military,  and  policing 
systems,  PNG’s  near  neighbour,  East  Timor,  had  become  a  failed  state 
requiring the intervention of a significant Australian military presence in order 
to re-establish peace and law and order and a basis for orderly administration 
(Kelly & Walters, 2006).  Following the re-establishment of order and the 
appointment of Jose Ramos Horta as Prime Minister to replace the inept Mari 
Alkatiri, Mr. Ramos Horta took the regrettable (but all too common in such 
situations)  step  of  criticising  the  very  intervention  by  Australia  which 
facilitated his appointment, the re-establishment of order within his country, 
and the avoidance of the deterioration of the situation into civil war. 
 
Whilst not apparently as critical, the conditions which pertain in PNG bear 
strong  similarities  to  those  which  existed  in  East  Timor  prior  to  the 
international intervention.  The open rivalry between clans; the patent failure 
of  governments  and  their  administrative  and  developmental  policies;  the 
growth in lawlessness and the deterioration in the county’s ability to control it;  
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the  requirement  for,  and  intervention  of,  Australian  police  and  advisory 
facilities;  and  the  open  criticism  by  the  PNG  Government  of  that  very 
intervention which continues to support its existence, the establishment and its 
right and propensity to issue such criticism is to name but a few indicators of 
imminent or pending political disorder. 
 
However,  as  stated  previously,  the  focus  in  examining  government  policy 
failure is that of its failure to serve the interests of the nation in maximising 
the economical and societal benefit of the country’s natural resources.  While 
recognising that the policies - and the administration and success or failure of 
those policies - are determined and driven in PNG, as in any other country, by 
politicians; it is not to say that policy failure can not be redressed by creating 
conditions which provide a basis for improved governance and policy success. 
 
As in any democracy, the elected representatives may have different economic 
objectives such as the promotion of particular projects, or the redistribution of 
economic benefits and these objectives will frequently conflict with those of 
other  representatives  or  government  officials.    These  objectives  can  also 
include political motives such as capturing a greater degree of control over the 
uses of the financial resources thereby enhancing the standing and power of a 
particular instrumentality (Ascher, 1999).  Such objectives may also be devoid 
of intentions to provide personal financial gain to the officials or politicians 
themselves.  Nevertheless, they may strive to control the determination and 
allocation of state financial resources for reasons contrary to the interests of  
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the state and its people which can not do other than precipitate failure of stated 
policy on an ongoing basis. 
 
5.2  Corruption 
The  reasons  which  are  most  often  propounded  as  to  why  inefficient 
administrative  and  monitoring  practices  are  condoned  relate  to  greed  and 
incompetence and the poor conduct of resource exploitation is not only caused 
by government policy deficiencies, but that such deficiencies can induce or 
even  force  such  conduct  (Ascher,  1999).    This  view  is  supported  by 
Livingstone (1989) in as much as he is of the opinion that, while developing 
countries may be potentially relatively wealthy in terms of resources, a failure 
on the part of these countries to translate this potential into a high per capita 
income is often the result of government imposed failure in terms of national 
infrastructure failure and instances of corruption on the part of government 
officials. 
 
With the demonstrated and explainable propensity which government officials 
and  politicians  in  PNG  have  to  focus  on  the  achievement  of  short-term 
objectives; the control and administration of the mining activity in remote and 
inaccessible areas and its impact on the environment appears to be, and to 
have  been,  regarded  as  too  difficult  and  too  long-term  to  warrant  any 
prolonged or serious attempt to master the complexity of the problem.    
 
Moreover,  it  is  often  the  case  that  manipulation  of  the  natural  resource  
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exploitation process is relatively simple because the distortion appears to carry 
a  low  likelihood  of  political  cost  -  the  current  losers  from  resource 
exploitation  manipulation  tend  to  be  the  poor  with  few  political  resources 
available to them and the losers in the future will be the future generations 
(Livingstone, 1989).  There are also many other financial resources related to 
the exploitation of the natural resource wealth available for manipulation such 
as the funds of central treasury, of the resource extractors, of the consumers, 
funds  from    government  grants  and  funds  from  international  loans.    The 
availability and access to these funds and the endemic accountability evasion 
in PNG contributes to corrupt practices in the funds administration. 
 
Corruption in PNG and neighbouring countries tends to be complicated (at 
least in its interpretation) by defensive or obfuscatory claims of traditional 
behaviour  and  the  assertion  that  gift-giving  is  a  traditional  Melanesian 
political activity  (Larmour, 1997).  However, despite the difficulty sometimes 
experienced in identifying or classifying behaviour as ‘grand’  corruption (i.e. 
the  use  of  public  office  for  private  gain),  the  implied  interpretation  of 
corruption is often made by sections of the electorate in PNG by reference to 
egalitarian traditions and an aversion toward, and suspicion of, accumulation 
(ibid.).   
 
Nevertheless, and referring principally to the findings of the 1989/1990 (Judge 
Thomas)  Barnett  Commission  of  Inquiry  established  by  the  then  prime 
minister, Paias Wingti, Larmour (1997) quite explicitly states that politicians  
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and public servants in PNG have used their public office for private gain by 
seeking and accepting bribes for themselves and politicians seeking funds for 
the respective political parties.   
 
The Barnett Commission of Inquiry uncovered  corruption on a huge scale 
including rampant evasion of corporate taxes (Dauvergne, 2001).  Thompson 
(1994) also noted in the same context, inter alia, that the forestry industry in 
PNG was rife with corruption, legislatively naive, bereft of any policy, and the 
responsible department demoralised and staffed by officers supported by the 
very companies which they were charged to monitor. 
 
The PNG Prime Minister, Sir Michael Somare, also went on the defensive at 
the APEC forum in November 2004 regarding gift-giving in PNG when he 
disputed its interpretation by Western countries as bribery.  He inferred that to 
so interpret such actions was to misunderstand the Papua New Guinean people 
(Niesi, 2004). 
 
The matter of corruption in PNG public and political life has been addressed 
in various attempts to stamp out such transgressions.  In another such attempt 
in 2004 the Ombudsman Commission began examining relevant provisions of 
the Constitution with a view to enabling the changes necessary in order to 
eliminate corruption.  However, in so doing, the Commission using a strange 
circular argument criticised, inter alia, the lack of adequate funding, a dearth 
of both proper funding and staff, and a general surge in corruption as obstacles  
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to completion of its task of corruption elimination (Rheeney, 2004).  The PNG 
Internal Revenue Commission, also in 2004, issued a call for departments and 
statutory  bodies  to  establish  internal  divisions  in  order  to  fight  corruption 
(PNG Post-Courier, 30 Sept. 2004). 
 
Referring to the work of investigative journalist for The Times of Papua New 
Guinea, Sinclaire Solomon, Joku (1995) states that Solomon’s investigations 
into the logging industry in PNG exposed a vast level of corruption which led 
to  a  public  outcry  and  the  establishment  of  the  Barnett  Commission  of 
Inquiry. Hughes (2002) was forthright in her interpretation of the distribution 
of the billions of dollars of Australian aid granted to Papua New Guinea since 
it achieved its independence when she stated forthrightly that a significant 
proportion of those funds had been stolen.   
 
She  went  on  to  say  that,  not  only  were  the  aid  funds  dissipated  by 
incompetence  and  corruption,  but  also  the  very  taxes  collected  on  the 
production  of  minerals  in  PNG  –  the  subject  of  the  grant  of  exploitation 
licences by the PNG Government and its ministers – became victim to the 
activities of successive PNG governments which, she said, spent like drunken 
sailors  on  projects  that  lined  their  own  pockets  for  over  20  years.    The 
abundant mineral wealth of PNG and high levels of foreign aid received by 
PNG over the years since independence precipitated windfall incomes which 
led  to  waste  and  corruption  (Windybank  &  Manning,  2003).    Moreover, 
Windybank  &  Manning  stated  that  the  practice  adopted  by  Australia  of  
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providing generous assistance to PNG even in the context of the existence of 
rampant  government  and  administrative  corruption  while  refraining  from 
dictating the circumstances for the administration of the aid has been a failure. 
 Filer et al. (2000) argue that the enormity of the Australian aid programme 
and the fact that it constitutes grant aid without conditions other than it be 
largely spent on Australian consultants allows the PNG Government to evade 
many of its undertakings in regard to development and the PNG chapter of 
Transparency  International  (2003)  stated  that  despite  its  natural  resource 
wealth PNG’s development has been undermined by wide-spread corruption 
with  monies  intended  to  be  used  for  social  services  being  stolen  by 
unscrupulous politicians and public servants. 
 
This  situation  was  exacerbated  at  the  end  of  2004.    The  Australian 
government, in an effort to augment some of those areas of governance in 
PNG  which  were  deemed  to  be  weak,  and  in  co-operation  with  the  PNG 
government,  embarked  on the  Enhanced  Co-operation  Package  (ECP)  at  a 
proposed cost to the Australian taxpayer of A$1.1 billion over a period of five 
years (Callinan, 2004).   
 
The particular focus of the ECP was in the area of administration of justice 
and government management procedures with approximately 200 Australian 
police officers and 70 Australian senior public  servants working alongside 
their  PNG  counterparts.    The  programme  was  generally  welcomed  to  the 
extent that former Prime Minister and opposition leader, Sir Mekere Morauta,  
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viewed the further assistance as necessary and felt opposition and resistance to 
the programme were manifestations of denial on the part of PNG leaders of 
the depth and gravity of the problems which challenged PNG (PNG Post-
Courier, 7 Dec. 2004).  
 
The  ECP  was  undertaken  in  the  context  of  endemic  corruption  and  an 
epidemic of lawlessness and terror exercised by uncontrolled 'raskol' gangs 
whose members viewed crime as an occupation and an acceptable way of life 
and  who  professed  a  readiness  to  shoot  and  kill  members  of  the  ECP 
(Callinan, 2004)   
 
However, despite the huge cost and intensive nature of the logistics of the 
ECP, a campaign of rumour-mongering, suggestions of the possibility of PNG 
sovereignty compromise, inferences that the ECP was a cover for Australian 
espionage activities, and legal challenges to the legitimacy of the ECP threw 
into question the viability of the programme while only yet in its infancy.  
Suggestions made included the assertion that the opposition to the ECP was 
the  result  of  concern  over  the  allegation  that  it  might  be  failing  and, 
conversely,  that  it  was  successful  to  the  point  that  its  investigations  into 
corruption in high places were beginning to bear fruit to the point of causing 
severe discomfort in certain areas (Patience, 2005 b).   
 
A legal challenge to the ECP was quickly initiated in the PNG Supreme Court 
by a former provincial governor and acting judge, Luther Wengte, with the  
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immediate  result  of  hindering  the  day-to-day  conduct  of  the  ECP  and 
throwing the concept as a whole into doubt.  This action was accompanied by 
threats of illegal strikes by hundreds of PNG police unless the programme was 
aborted (Rheeney et al., 2005).   
 
These strikes followed shortly on the release of the results of an administrative 
review  of  the  Royal  Papua  New  Guinea  Constabulary  which  found 
overwhelming evidence of corruption in the force.  In presenting the review 
report to the PNG Parliament in March 2005, the Internal Security Minister, 
Mr. Bire Kimisopa told the parliament that apathy and corruption was rampant 
in  the  police  force  along  with  complacency,  incompetence,  and 
insubordination.  He stated that the very institution vested with the primary 
responsibility  of  enforcing  the  law  was  teetering  on  the  brink  of  collapse 
(Rheeney  &  Orere,  2005)  which  bears  out  the  concerns  addressed  by 
Windybank & Manning (2003) among many who predicted chaos spreading 
to other parts of the country and administration.   
 
Nevertheless,  on  Friday,  13th  May  2005,  the  PNG  Supreme  Court 
unanimously  ruled  that  certain  provisions  of  the  act  of  parliament  which 
established the ECP - namely those which granted immunity from prosecution 
for  Australian  police  and  officials  -  were  inconsistent  with  the  PNG 
constitution.  The result was the immediate cessation of all duties of the police 
and  officials  seconded  by  Australia  for  duty in PNG.    Mr.  Wengte,  when 
interviewed after the delivery of the judgement, expressed the expectation that  
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future  assistance  should  be  in  the  form  of  logistical  support  which  would 
include  vehicles,  firearms,  and  other  equipment  (Skehan,  2005).    His 
expectation is symptomatic of the naive arrogance of those who believe in a 
right to assistance from the Australian Government and Australian taxpayers 
without a corresponding responsibility to account for the manner in which that 
assistance is administered.  
 
In October 2004 Professor Allan Patience, head of the University of Papua 
New  Guinea's  Political  Science  division,  labelled  PNG  politicians  political 
pimps  and  parliamentary  fools  for  their  failure  to  design  and  implement 
policies  which  would  benefit  the  Nation.    He  expressed  the  opinion  that 
money and corruption had destroyed the country and he decried the wide use 
of  'slush  funds'  by  politicians  at  times  of  elections  to  bribe  voters  with 
"depraved inducements" which, he said, constituted the prostitution of Papua 
New Guinean democracy (PNG Post-Courier 20 October 2004). 
 
Serious  problems  of  governance  and  corruption  continue  to  hamper 
development in PNG (World Bank, 2006).  Despite the enormous sums of aid 
money distributed by Australia and others to PNG, Port Moresby is rated as 
one of the most 'unliveable' cities in the world and the government elites - 
those who ensure that they are the principal beneficiaries of the international 
aid - live behind barbed wire and send their children to Australia for their 
education (Hughes, 2006).  
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The level of open acceptance of corruption is such that in 1998, to ensure 
support for the 1999 budget the then prime minister, Bill Skate, issued an 
ultimatum to his ministers that they either choose to support the budget or 
they would lose access to development funds; in other words, they would lose 
their ‘slush funds’ (Pitts, 2002, p.40).  The following year, on 17 September 
1999, the then Prime Minister, Sir Mekere Morauta, told the PNG parliament 
that the antics of PNG politicians had brought  ridicule to the country and 
stated  that  the  PNG  economy  was  being  destroyed  by  a  combination  of 
incompetence and corruption (Asia Times Online Co., Ltd.).   
 
Yet  less  than  three  months  later,  on  30  November  1999,  the  same  Prime 
Minister emulated the conduct of his predecessor in permitting the country's 
politicians to retain their slush funds (known as Rural Development Funds) in 
order to effect the passage of the 2000 Budget (Pitts, 2002).  There followed 
widespread  condemnation  of  the  action  from  NGOs,  public  figures,  and 
international business.   
 
In spite of all such condemnation Sir Robbie Namaliu, another former prime 
minister of PNG, was quoted by the PNG Post-Courier (23 October 2000) as 
stating that despite the uncovering of massive scandals involving state-owned 
corporations and institutions over the previous five years, no one would be 
prosecuted and he called for the establishment of a permanent independent 
anti-corruption commission to restore public confidence in government. 
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It is clear, therefore, that PNG is a country with a political system which 
encourages instability and corruption.  The accrual and dispensing of largesse 
by politicians creates a situation which depicts the PNG bureaucracy as highly 
politicised and infused with endemic corruption (ADB, 2006).  One effect of 
this is a body of politicians with very short-term goals.   PNG is similar to 
"many  other  resource-rich  and  capacity-poor  economies  where  policy  and 
institutional  weaknesses  have  facilitated  rent-seeking  behaviour  by  public 
officials, led to pervasive corruption in public administration, and weakened 
confidence in government" (ADB, 2006, p.6) and that the relevant agencies 
lack the political will to fight corruption. 
 
In The Australian (June 14, 1995 p.17) PNG’s Governor General was reported 
as  warning  of  the  possibility  of  greed  and  corruption  becoming  deeply 
embedded  in  Papua  New  Guinean  society.    The  provincial  government 
system,  introduced  in  1976  with  the  establishment  of  nineteen  provincial 
governments,  was  shortly  thereafter  forced  into  suspension  as  a  result  of 
mismanagement  or  corruption  and  was  radically  modified  by  the  1995 
Constitutional Review Commission (the Micah Commission) ((Lipscomb et 
al. 1998).   
 
The conduct and attitude of successive PNG governments, moreover, in their 
greed, sloth, sheer incompetence, and outright corruption precipitate a feeling 
of victimisation on the part of the citizens who then copy the behaviour of 
their leaders in an effort to better their own lot in life (Pitts, 2002).  Their  
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behaviour manifests itself in crime, corruption, and low productivity and they 
distance  themselves  from  state  process  and  state-driven  crime  control 
strategies.  It is not the system of government which renders good governance 
elusive, however, but rather the conduct of senior bureaucrats and politicians 
and political interference in the administration of the public sector (Donigi, 
1998). 
 
Yati  Bun,  the  former  chairman  of  PEAK  and  executive  director  of  the 
Foundation for People and Community Development, an NGO based in Port 
Moresby,  in  2002  accused  PNG  public  servants  of  having  changed  their 
mentality and focus from that of service to the public to an attitude of service 
to themselves.  He regretted the fact that, throughout the government sector, 
one  could  not  expect  to  achieve  any  objective  unless  compensation  was 
provided to the parties concerned and he cites several exacerbating aspects to 
the problem of corruption in PNG.  Of particular concern in his view are 
political parties and individual politicians in PNG being dependent on private 
donations for their funding with public disclosure on the source of these funds 
and the manner in which they are used being totally absent.  The incidence of 
political appointments among senior public servants and the fact that a new 
minister will frequently dismiss the previous incumbents to make his own 
appointments were also prominent among his concerns and he decried the fact 
that, in circumstances of allegations of corruption, a leader may resign and 
even if prosecuted and found guilty, the maximum penalty is only a three year 
ban from office. (Bun, 2002).  
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Chapter 6    Conclusion and Recommendation for Further Study 
 
As stated at the outset, PNG has many policy instruments which are designed 
to  provide  a  model  of  environmentally  sustainable  development  and  to 
provide a system of monitoring and control of that development.  However, 
despite such instruments, the PNG Government has failed to demonstrate a 
willingness  to  assiduously  address  environmental  problems  -  much  less  a 
willingness to deal with the widespread environmental degradation which has 
resulted from, and is exacerbated by, that very policy failure. 
 
This administrative, policy, and governance failure is a function, as has been 
seen, of several factors.  At a fundamental level the requirement to monitor 
and  police  environmental  undertakings  and  responsibilities  of  mining 
operations based in highly inaccessible and mountainous locations is a hugely 
difficult and costly exercise.  That that requirement is the responsibility of 
consecutive governments which, while paying lip service to the concept, seem 
devoid of the political will to ensure its execution makes the likelihood of any 
genuine attempt at proper environmental governance, at best, slight. 
 
The  position  in  PNG  is  exacerbated  by  the  total  absence  of  government 
services in many areas.  In some regions, travel is made almost impossible by 
roads in a state of disrepair and the likelihood of armed robbery of travellers.  
Political  wrangling  is  made  worse  by  fraud  and  a  frequent  inadequacy  of 
funds to pay staff in regional administrations.  Reducing administrative and  
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financial assistance from central government to rural regions precipitates a 
vicious cycle in continuing migration of unemployed and uneducated persons 
into urban areas, particularly to the capital, Port Moresby, which in turn adds 
to  the  already  growing  unemployment  and  lawlessness  in  the  cities.  
Corruption flourishes with daily reports of abuse of power by politicians and 
bureaucrats and researchers believe that less than half of the crimes committed 
are  reported to police.  In all of this the benefits of cheating and fraudulent 
activity are reinforced in an already cynical population which largely regards 
the legal system as irrelevant (Pitts, 2002).   
 
The  degradation  of  the  environment  is,  as  we  have  seen,  a  function  of 
governmental failure, market failure, and widespread poverty.  The failure to 
recognise the environment as a capital asset to be protected for the future is 
due  to  the  common  property  nature  of  the  environmnent  leading  to 
degradation and depreciation of the environment (Sathiendrakumar, 2006). 
 
In a practical sense the levels of corruption which have been identified; the 
parlous  nature  of  the  occupational  tenure  of  politicians  and  administrative 
officials; the extreme difficulty in accessing mine sites for monitoring and 
policing due to the state of disrepair of the road system; and the very real 
dangers to life and limb as a result of the likelihood of armed robbery renders 
the question of environmental degradation of little or no importance to those 
charged with the protection of the environment .  
  
 
 
 
- 137 - 
Failure to prevent such degradation has a flow-on effect which adds to the 
resource depletion and such depletion cannot be justified by the societal gains 
achieved  as  a  result.  The  ignorance,  incompetence,  inefficiency,  and 
administrative weakness which contributes to the degradation may even be the 
intended result of government policy in order to provide a level of protection 
for officials from criticism (Ascher, 1999 p.28).. 
 
However, it is clear that such policy failures are not simply the results of 
ignorance  of  the  situation  or  incapacity  to  address  remedial  options.  The 
evidence  deduced  regarding  the  parlous  nature  of  the  PNG  economy  also 
supports  the  premise  that  a  strong  motivator  in  this  government  decision-
making process regarding resource exploitation – and possibly a contributing 
factor in the inefficiencies evident in that function - is, in fact, a desperation 
precipitated  by  a  pincer  effect  of  a  declining  economic  performance  and 
diminishing tax receipts coupled with that of an ever-increasing requirement 
for government revenues.   
 
In Papua New Guinea minerals constitute a greater component of national 
exports  than  most  other  Pacific  Rim  countries  and  this  has  precipitated  a 
powerful  incentive  for  successive  PNG  governments  to  ensure  the 
implementation and continuation of resource projects.  The development of 
natural  resource  projects  in  order  to  provide  continuing  inflow  of  national 
revenues has become central to the ongoing provision of the basic elements of 
governance and the public service in PNG (Howitt et al., 1996).  There is an  
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understandable  perception  on  the  part  of  the  government  that  rigourous 
monitoring and policing of mining activities and restriction of activities which 
cause  damage  to  the  environment  jeopardise  the  continuing  flow  of 
government revenues from the mining industry. 
 
A  major  motivator  in  the  neglect  of  remedial  attention  to  environmental 
degradation - either by government sanction or by government toleration, i.e. 
by commission or by omission, - which has taken place in the mining industry 
is the result of a desire on the part of government to not only ensure the 
continuation of mining royalties and revenues but to maximise those revenues 
from the industry.   
 
During the period of the 1980s, mining was both the most visible economic 
sector in PNG and that which was most responsible for setting the swings of 
the  internal  business  cycle  from  exploration  to  exports  (Thompson  & 
MacWilliam,  1992)  and  as  a  result  received  the  most  direct  government 
attention both from the point of view of facilitation of the activity and of 
ensuring maximisation of the revenues. 
 
The very fact of the 'openness' of the PNG economy, in terms of the high 
levels of imports and exports relative to the country’s GDP, exacerbates the 
negative  effects  on  economic  performance  due  to  any  external  shocks  to 
PNG's primary commodity exports, such as a decline in FDI, on which the 
economy is so heavily dependent (Rahland and Ecevit 2002).   The recent  
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external  shocks  felt  by  the  PNG  economy  have  been  a  result  of  the 
diminishing  attractiveness  of  the  country  as  an  international  investment 
destination.  This has occurred for various reasons - not least of which is the 
growing lawlessness of the country and growing perceptions of defensiveness 
on the part of the government to international criticisms.  These events have 
so dramatically affected the political and economic structure of the country as 
to prompt Windybank & Manning (2003) to suggest that PNG is in grave 
danger of succumbing to economic paralysis, government collapse, and social 
despair.  While it is not within the ambit of this examination to pursue; it is 
relevant to observe that there appears to be a progressive relationship between 
the  obvious  breakdown  in  law  and  order  within  PNG  and  the  continuing 
deterioration in the environmental standards and safeguards. 
 
It would appear, therefore, that the causes of the policy failures in the instance 
of the mining industry in Papua New Guinea are a combination of  
 
(1)   government and individual officials’ incompetence;   
 
(2)   monitoring and policing difficulties due to the remote locations of the 
mining activities exaggerated by the neglected and precarious nature of 
the country's infrastructure;   
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(3)  greed  for  the  capture  of  potential  revenues  to  be  generated  both 
nationally and provincially, and for the benefits potentially to be had by 
control of the decision-making process;  
 
(4)  endemic corruption which focusses politicians' and officials' attention on 
ignoring that which is likely to diminish the source and means of their 
own self-service; and,  
 
(5)   the  potential  pursuit  of  other  economic  programmes  perceived  to  be 
facilitated by the environmental neglect involved in that activity.   
 
There is a general and understandable distress on the part of PNG citizens at 
the  patent  lack  of  a  form  of  government  which  provides  trustworthy, 
transparent, and firm leadership with consensus of vision to tackle social and 
economic obstacles.  Whether, in light of the evidence presented in this thesis, 
there is a possibility of reorientating the political, legal, and social climate in 
PNG in order to facilitate that leadership of trust, confidence, and integrity  
and  thereby  obviate  the  dissipation  of  the  riches  of  the  country  and  its 
environment is an aspiration which is, at best, questionable.  
 
The  development  initiatives  in  PNG,  either  of government  programmes  or 
community-based programmes, are dependent on aid for their funding and 
direction (Pitts, 2002).   The habitual dissipation of substantial and continuing 
financial aid from Australia and world organisations not only causes further  
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distress on the part of the PNG people but also  raises questions - if not of the 
likelihood of the continuation of such assistance - at least of the likelihood of 
its  continuation  with  its  distribution  unfettered  by  regulatory  and 
administrative controls.   
 
Despite the implementation of such programmes and their enormous cost and 
despite the fact of contributing the equivalent of 20 per cent of the national 
budget of Papua New Guinea in the year 2003-2004 (AusAID, 2004), neither 
that body (AusAID) nor the Australian government has been given - nor has it 
as yet insisted upon - the right to determine or oversee that its taxpayers’ 
funds  are  spent  efficiently.    The  extraordinary  degree  of  sensitivity 
demonstrated by this fact on the part of donor governments and apparently 
driven by an aversion to the possibility of accusations of neo-colonialism or 
inferences of political callousness, cannot be seen to be other than having a 
serious  contributing  influence  toward  the  maintenance  and  aggravation  of 
existing levels of inefficiency and corruption.  Moreover, such reticence can 
only be seen as being conducive to an emboldening attitude on the part of 
those  who  allege  ulterior  motives  in  the  granting  of  such  aid  and  to  a 
strengthening in the demands for such aid to be granted without constraint as 
to the manner in which it might be expended. 
 
It can be argued that all such sensitivities are, and will be, in vain since any 
activity  on  the  part  of  any  government  involved  in  grant  aid  will  attract 
criticism in regard to some aspect of that activity.  A case in point is the  
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somewhat  facile  and  unsupported  condemnation  of  AusAID  assistance  to 
PNG of those such as the Australian academic, Tim Anderson (2004), when 
he refers to cynicism and self-interest as being the motivators in Australian 
foreign policy toward PNG which he claims is symptomatic of an effort by 
Australia to push a new colonial agenda.  It should be expected, however, that 
any attempt to monitor or fetter the distribution of huge amounts of aid in a 
political and economic climate riddled with corruption will be expected to 
meet with cries of indignation and accusations of colonial patronising. 
 
It is more cogently arguable that PNG, having received c.$15.5 billion in aid 
funding since 1970
6, is now facing greater social, economic, administrative, 
and environmental difficulties than it has since achieving its independence in 
1975.  The legacy of the colonial period, terminated as a result of international 
pressure amid those very accusations, was rather a deteriorating, fragmented, 
and  inadequate  governance  with  the  political  and  legal  systems  being 
managed  by  a  mere  one  per  cent  of  the  population  and  that  political 
fragmentation  was  reinforced  by  the  increasing  occurrence  of  tensions 
between provincial and national politicians (Pitts, 2002). 
 
There  is  a  great  diversity  of  problems  faced  by  PNG  on  its  path  to  self-
sufficiency and economic prosperity.  These include, but are not limited to, 
the  very  question  of  enforcing  a  rigourous  regimen  of  environmental 
                                                 
6   Source  The Development Assistance Committee, Development Co-operation 
Reports, 1971-2000, OECD Paris, (taken from Hughes (2003 p.20)  
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protection - the absence of which is demonstrated in Chapter 4; the building of 
an arterial infrastructure capable of serving and interconnecting the growing 
nation's  requirements;    the  establishment  of  an  effective  and  competent 
bureaucratic  administration;  and  the  elimination  of  the  country's  endemic 
corruption and lawlessness.   
 
The question is open to examination as to whether there can be any hope or 
expectation of resolving these enormous problems without the imposition of 
some  system  of  monitoring,  reporting,  and  accountability  in  regard  to  the 
enormous amounts of aid annually provided to PNG.   The associated matter 
of  the  possibility  of  potential  culpability  on  the  part  of  the  foreign 
governmental aid-givers – principally Australia – from the point of view of 
the manner and ease with which these aid funds were granted should also be 
addressed.    The  fact  of  this  mode  of  granting  aid  without  an  effective 
requirement - or, indeed, mechanism - for any realistic monitoring of the way 
in which the funds were distributed, cannot be  other than a very real and 
tangible  contributing  factor  in  accountability  evasion  on  the  part  of 
government members and officials charged with the management of the funds 
received. 
 
It  would  have  been,  in  the  initial  years  of  the  granting  of  the  aid  funds, 
deemed condescending by the aid givers and, in modern parlance, politically 
incorrect  to  subject  to  scrutiny  and  audit  the  internal  administration  and 
manner of distribution of the aid granted.  This view pertained because of the  
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fact  that  the  administration  of  the  aid  funds  received  was  conducted  by  a 
sovereign national government and its officers.  That perceived impediment to 
scrutiny – and, indeed, to the provision of any assistance in the administration 
of the funds - was exacerbated by the fact, and the attendant perceptions and 
misperceptions, of the relatively recent colonial history of PNG.   
 
Nevertheless, to have simply handed out and to continue to deliver enormous 
levels  of  funding  to  successive  PNG  governments  not  only  bears  closer 
examination but also cannot be other than a contributor to the mismanagement 
and  misuse  of  those  funds.  That  such  a  situation  should  continue  in  an 
environment which is conducive to its further propagation is arguably an even 
greater  betrayal  on  the  part  of  the  donor  governments  in  the  name  of 
humanitarian aid.  That that aid might, in any way, be regarded as a salve for 
the conscience of the donor governments compounds the omission rather than 
contributing to its amelioration.  Professor Hughes, in another paper on the 
subject (2003), states that AusAID’s administration function in the Pacific is 
crippled by virtue of being constrained from expressing its views as to the 
likelihood of the success of its aid.  As illustrated in Section 1.3, Gupta et al. 
(2004)  demonstrated  that  for  every  extra  aid  dollar  received  by  an  aid-
dependent country the recipient government raises 28% less in tax and the 
more corrupt the country the more that country's revenues decline as the aid it 
receives increases.   The question of aid and its delivery, particularly in this 
context, is a matter worthy of further investigation. 
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